Washington and Lee University School of Law

Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons
Supreme Court Case Files

Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers

10-1978

Arkansas v. Sanders
Lewis F. Powell Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the Fourth Amendment
Commons

Recommended Citation
Arkansas v. Sanders. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 59. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.

This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers at
Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme
Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

treliminary Memo

/
June 8> 1978 ConfeJ::ence
List 1, Sheet 3
No. 77-1497
ARKANSAS

Cert to Arkansas
Supreme Court
(Howard for the
court)
State/Criminal

Vo

SANDERS
1.

SUl1HARY':

Timely

This is another petition presenting

an issue concerning the overlap of United States v.

Chaj_~_i r.::_~,

433 U.S. 1 (1977), and the automobile search exception.

Here

the Arkansas Supr eme Court held that the warrantless search
o f resp's suitcase, which the police seized from the trunk of
a taxicab in which resp was riding, was unreasonable ancJ thus
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

---------
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2.

FACTS:

Little Rock police were provided information

by an informant that resp had taken an empty green suitcase to
Dallas for the purpose of transporting marijuana back to Little
Rock and that he was scheduled to arrive back in Little Rock
during the afternoon of April 23, 1976.

.

-

policemen were waiting at the

~rt

Three plainclothes

when resp arrived.

They

observed him get off a plare that had come from Dallas and then
proceed to the baggage area.

There he picked up a green suitcase,

which he handed to a man

he met there, David Rambo.

~vhom

then went outside the terminal and got in a taxicab.

Resp

He was joined

by Rambo, who placed the green suitcase in the trunk of the cab.
The officers followed the cab as it left the air port and
traveled down a major street in Little Rock.

They reque s ted

assistance from a marked police car over their radio, an d tha t car
eventually stopped the cab.

The cab driver was asked to get out

--of the car and to open the trunk, which he did.

Resp and Rambo

were taken out of the cab by the police and placed agains t the
side of the vehicle, while the police looked in the trunk.

Without

seeking anyone's consent, the officei:s opened the unlo cked green
suit case and found 9.3 pounds of marijuana.

Resp and Rambo we r e

placed under arrest and taken to the police station.
Resp was charged with possession of marijuana with intent
to deliver.

His motion to suppr e s s the marijuana was denie d by

the trial court, and he
\\7 a s

~vas

sentenc e d to 10 yea r s

1

convicted following a jury t r ial.
impris onment and fined $15,000.

Res p

- 3 On appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the
conviction, holding that the search of the suitcase violated
the Fourth Amendment.

The court agreed with the State that

the police officers had probable cause to believe the resp's
suitcase contained a controlled substance.

Nevertheless, it

held that there were no exigent circumstances permitting the
search to be conducted without a warrant.

It rejected the

State's argument that the search fell within the automobile
exception, noting that the Court had stated in United States
v. Chadwick, supra, that the factors diminishing the privacy
aspects of an automobile do not apply to a person's suitc ase .
Furthermore, said the court, the suitcase's mobility did not
justify dispensing with the added protections of the Warrant
Clause.

Once the police had

~eized

the suitcase from the trunk

of the cab and had it under their exclusive control, "there. wa.s

~------------------------------

not the slightest danger that the suitcase or its contents could
have been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained."

Thus the police should have obtaine d a ·wa rrant before

searching it.
3.

CONTENTIONS:

The State argues that the decision

below is in conflict with decisions of this Court concerning the
automobile search exception.
odds with

~ambers

In particular, the decision is a t

v. Maroney, 399 U.S.

Court said that for constitutional

L~2

pu1~p oses

(1970), for there the
tl.leJ~ e

was no dif-

ference between, on the one hand, seizing a car and holding it
until a warrant is obtained and, on the other hand)

cm~ry:i.ng

out

- 4 -

an immediate search of the car·without a warrant.

The State

argues that the same should be true in this case; if it was
permissible for the officers to seize the suitcase under the
automobile ex ception, then an immediate search of the suitcase should also be constitutional.
The Arkansas Supreme Court also misinterpreted the
Court's holding in Chadwick, says the State.

The decision

below could lead to the elimination altogether of the automobile

-

exception, for applying the reasoning of the Arkansas court, one

----------------------------------------------

could argue in many circumstances that the. car itself was unde r
the complete control of the police and thus a warrant to search
was required.

The State says that other courts have held that

Chadwick is not applicable to automobile searches, eve n when
luggage contained within the car is among the objects searched.
Accordingly, the State argues, the decision below is in conflict
with various decisions of federal courts of appeals and state
supreme courts.
4.

DISCUSSION:

We have had several petitions th i s

year questioning the applicability of Chadwick to the automob i l e
search situation.

As far as I know, this is the first decision

to conclude that Chachvick is applicable in such a case.

The

decision of the Arkansas court certainly f i nds some support in
Chadwick, for there the Court did note the differ enc e s be t ween

.:1

person's privacy expectations with regard to his car an d with
regard to his luggage.

Se e 433 U.S., at 13.

Moreover, the Court

relied on the fact that once the fed e ral agents had s e ized the

~u~

-----
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~~
~

footlocker in that case and had gained exclusive control
over it, there was no danger of it or its contents being
removed before a warrant could be obtained.

Nevertheless,

:;;:;~
}

~

the Court expressly stated that there was no contention in
Chadwick that the automobile search exception was applicable.
\

(The footlocker had just been placed in the trunk of a 1 ~ arked
car
....._ at the time it was seizedo)

-

Justice Brennan's concurring
~

opinion also makes it clear that that decision did not decide
whether a warrantless search would have been valid if the
footlocker had been seized after the defendants had driven away

with it in their car .

He states in a footnote:

"While the

contents of the car could have been searched pursuant to the

IAJ) } ~ S

?

auto)llobile exception, it is by no means clear that the. contents VV""
of locked containers found inside a car are subject to sear yh
under this exception, any more than they would be if the
found them in any other place."

n•. ~~

p~ ~

(Here the suitcase was not

locked.)
~

Should the Court he interested in considering the
scope of Chadwick and its applicability to searches of suitcases
found within automobiles, this appears to be a good case for
doing so .
There is no response.

5/26/78
ME

Gibson
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Petition
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From: Mr . J us t ic e Blackmun
Circulated : ___________

1st DRAFT

Recirculat ed:

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
STATE OF ARKA);"SAR v. LOi'\i'\IE JAMES SANDERS
ON PETITION FOR WHlT OF' CEWI.'fOHAHI '1'0 'l'HE 8UPHEME COURT
01<~ AllKANSAS

No. 77- 1-JW. Dt'<'ilkcl October -, 107

Mn.

JesTIChl BLACKMUN.

disse11ting.

This case is illustrativr of the difficulties and the confusion
that United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1077) , has
spawrwcl. If the C'ourt)s decision in Chadwick is correct (a
proposition 1 srriously douht. for 1 was in dissent there, id.,
at 17), the Court. instead of being reluctant. ought forthwith
to assume the task of clarifying the resulting confusio11.
Law enforr.ement authorities. the accused , am! courts alike
deserve to know and to b<> advised as to what, if anything, is
required befor<> a container- locked or unlocked, box, handbag,
briefcasf'. envelop;poUCh. or luggage-present in an a utonlohile may be se1zef or examilW< when therP is probable cause
to believe it contains a controlled substa.nce or other contraband. Jf tlwre remains any automobile exception after
Chadwick , as the Court professrd. id., at 12. its boundaries
should be establishrd now. 1 therefore agree with MR . .JusTICE
WHrrJoJ that th<' ( 'ourt should grant crrtiorari in this case, and
I dissent from its refusal to do so.

J

SEP 27 1978

"---"

Chief Justice
JusticG Brennan
Just:Lce Stewart
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Mr. Just:i.ce Powell
Mr. Justice RJhnquist
Mr. Justice Stevans

To: The
Mr .
Mr.
Mr.

•

•

Y·

From: Mr. Justice White
Circulated:

1st DRAFT

Recirculated: ___________

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT:m
STATE OF ARKA"\'SAS v. LONNIE JAMES

SA~DERS

ON FETl'l'TON FOR WHI'r OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT
OF ARKANSAS

To. 77- 1497. Decicl<-cl October -, 197

MH. JoBTICE vrHJTE, chssc>nting.
This casr pr<'srn ts tlw issLw whether thr Fourth Amcndnwnt prohibits a11 immediatr warrantless search of an unloehcl st.!,itcasc' found Jll the trunk of a vchiclf' stopJwd by
officers w1th ( )l'obable eausr to believe tlw suitcase contains
C'ontraban<l. The• Rupren1e Court of Arkansas held that it
clof's. finding that the exJwctation of privacy in a suitcase,
rvrn an unlocked onC'. is .sig;-uficanWy '"gre~ter tha7, tha£ sm1ply
iu the automobih' itsel r-~v. 'StaTe, "2~ lrrk. 5!1b,559
R. ~i't"'1tr4tffim. Though a suitcase• is easily moveable.
tlw court held that that c•xigent circumstance \<\'aS vitiated once
tlw police• had S<'iZ<'<l the suitcase and placrcl it within their
rxcl usi w c~o n tro1.
I11 n•aehing its conclusion. the court below relied in part on
our deciswn in United States\'. Chadwick, 433 l'. R. 1 (1977) ,
though that case invol v<>d a locked footlocker and no con tenLion. in this Cow·t. thaCtlw automobile search exception was
applicabk. SincP Chaau~ick, the federal courts of appe~s
have n•achcd conftJCting decisions on whether immediate warrantless S<:'arches of luggagf' found in an automobile are perlnissibh• as falling within tlw scope of a warrantless vehicle
Hearch. ( 'oillparc [I niterl States \'. Stev·ie, :No. 77-1335 (CA8
t'll bane Aug. 15. 1D7R) (finding the search unlav..·ful undf'r
Chadwick) . ·with Umted States " · Finnegan, 561-\ F. 2d 637
(CA9 1977) (upholdi11g the search). Se<' also U11Ued States
\ . jl!fontuumery, 558 F. 2d :~11 (CA5 per curiam) (on petition
for rchearlllg) ( rc•serving tlH• istiUC). Prior to Chadwick, the
fe(kral courts had lllllformly h<' ld that once a y(•hicle is subJ <~\"1ul \\ arhititTc::'iH sra?cfi SUitcases inwle the vc:ri"icle

-

·'

~~ 7

2

AllKAKS.\S v. ..·A~DERS

may also bP O]wnrd and SC'archrd without wanant. E. g.,
United tates v. Chuke, 554 F . 2d 2
977); United
States v. McCambridge, ;)51 F. 2d R65 ~ 1977); Uuited
States v. 'I'ramu11ti, 513 F. :2d 1087 vcxzy, cert. cknicd, 423
U. fl. 832 (1!)75 · ['uited States v. "sariano, 4!!7 F. 2d 147
D74)
(C'A5 Pn batt
My eolleagues failurr to S('iZE' this opportuttity to t'esolve
the Rquarc conflict and elarify the implicatiot1S of Chadwick
<l<'ttiet=: IH'e<kd guidatle(' to ittdividuals seckinv; to assure theil'
privacy and law enforcemc'nt officials seeking to operate within
constitutional constraints. The question prE'sc·nt<'d will one
day have to h(' <:Utswered by thi~:> Court. In thP nwantinw,
the' Fourth AtnrtHlment will mean somethiug in some jurisdictions that it will not mean in others. Because assuring that
th<' Constitution stands for the' same things throughout the
Nation is a central purpOS(' and obligation of this Court, I
tliss<'nt from th l' rl<>nial of C'l'rtiorari.

•

.
>

.:§uprttttt ~curlllf tlrt ~tb .:§hrl:tg

...ufri:ttgtan. ~. ~· 2ll,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

September 27, 1978

Re:

No. 77-1497

Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Byron:
Please join me.

.r

Sincerely,

Mr. Justice White
Copies to the Conference

u

~- ~L.A..--'

1-o ~ ~f-1/~,

Ur.
Jir.
Mr.
ttr.
J::r •
Mr.

77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

~:

J ·.-t1'"' 3 Brennan
Just1-oa Stewart
:Justtoe t7h1 te .
J~Gtioe t!a.rahall ·
.Justice Ble..olanun
..Tust1oe Powell ../
1ustioe . Rabnqu1at

Dr.

Just~oe Stevens

~1roulatedr $rl 2 8 ·
Recirculated:------

MR. JUSTICE

S~EVENS,

concu~ring.

Occasionally an order denying certiorari does

ind~cate

that

the Court has shirked i ts duty to resolve important and clear
cut conflicts among the Ctrcuits.l 1

This, however, ~s not

such a case because the asserted conflict is i11usorv.

In the only post-Chadwick~/ case relied upon bv
petitioner to establish the "conflict" with this, or anv other
case, the court held:

"[E]ven rif] Chadwick applies and requires a ru1ing that
the search of the suitcase was unlawful, we would
nevertheless be compe,led to affirm rbecausel the a~miss~on
into evidence of the fru~ts of the search was harm1esR
beyond a reasonable doubt." untted States v. Finnegan, S~8
F.2d 637, 642 (CA9 1977).
-

1/ Compare Mansfield v. Estelle, No. 77-2517 (~AS Feb. Q,
1'9"78), cert. denied, No. 77-6709 (
1978), '"ith, e.g.,
United States v. Neff, 525 F. 2d 3111 (<:A8 ll:l75) ~ compare Un,. ted
States v. Lacey, No. 77-1450 (~A2 March 31, 1q78), ce~t.
den1ed, No. 77-1751 (
lq78), with United States v.
Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159 (CA9 Jq77).
2/ It is of course irreleyaut .that the result in this case
conflicts with the result in other cases ci. teCI by petitioner
that were decided before Chadwick clarified the law in this
area.
E.g., United States v. Soriano, 497 F.?.CI 147 (CAS en
bane 1974).

,. ·.

77-1497
- 2 -

..

This r.ourt need not expend its scarce resources resolving
"conflicts" created by dicta or

aJternat~ve

holdings.

Moreover, even the alternative holding in Finnegan does not
conflict with the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in this
case.l/

I am therefore persuaded that the Court has acted

wisely jn refusing to hear this particular case on the merits.
As is so often true, the

op~nions

certiorari create an unwarranted

dissenting from the denial or
imp~ession.

3/ Finnegan involved the stop and search of a vehicle owned by
the driver-suspect based on information unrelated to the
possible contents of luggage: the search of the , ug.g.age- was
incidental to a complete search of the vehicle.
In this case,
by contrast, the police stopped a taxicab because they had
probable cause to believe a suitcase placed in the cab by a
passenger contained marijuana.
As in Chadwick, there was
nothing to prevent them, after seizing the suitcase, from
obtaining a warrant before thev opened it. Accord, United
States v. Stevie, No. 77-1335 (CA8 en hanc A.ug. it;, 1q7g).
Even 1f correctly applied in Finnegan, the so-called
"automobile exception" is irrelevant in this case because, as
was true in Chadwick, ther~ .~as no search of the vehicle.

/'

.. .
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State of
Dear Chief:
I am persuaded by the dissents circulated by Byron
.
and Harry that we should grant this case to resolve the
conflict that already exists, and to try - difficult as
it may be - to give guidance to law enforcement: autnorities
who are confronted daily with automobile search questions.
·, Thus, I will change my vote to a grant. I believe
this provides the fourth vote to· take this case.
Sincerely,

·The Chief
lfp/ss

'·
~npr.enu

Q}ltttrl ttf tlft ~ ~hdtg
JfagJ.rittghm. ~. QJ. 2Ilgt'!$

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

September 28, 1978

Re:

77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Chief:

''

If the four votes to grant certiorari in this
case remain firm, I wonder if we should consider
directing the parties to argue the question whether
Chadwick is retroactive.
You will note that this
case 1nvolves a pre-Chadwick search. May we discuss
this suggestion at our next Conference?
Respectfully,

fL
The Chief Justice
Copies to the Conference

. --

~u:prttnt

QJ'ttnrt ttf tqt ~tb $)mug
:Was!p:ttgLm. ~. <!J. 2llbT~?

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

September 28, 1978

Re:

No. 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Harry:
I have already joined Byron's dissent from the denial
of certiorari in this case
d would likewise join yours
except for the fact tha Lewis' note indicating that he now
intends to vote to gran
lOrari means that this case will
turn out to be a "grar:.,t". I shall, therefore, await our
next Conference, intending to stand by my vote to "grant" in
this case.
Sincerely,~

Mr. Justice Blackmun
Copies to the Conference
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DW 3/21/79

Memorandum
To:

Justice Powell

Re:

Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497
Here is my first draft in Sanders--refreshingly short,

as you will see.

I hope that I have covered everything.

We

have taken the liberty of having Paul edit the draft before you
saw it, as we thought that you might not want to plunge right
into opinions.
efforts.
of.

The copy included herewith represents our joint

There is one change Paul made that I am not certain

Originally the final two paragraphs of footnote 13 were in

the text, just before the last paragraph of the opinion.
thinks this comes as an afterthought.

Paul

We agreed that I would

place the material in the footnote and then ask for your views.
I hope this doesn't hurt your digestion any.
3/21/79

David

DW 3/21/79

Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497
First Draft (edited by Paul)
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether police are
required to obtain a warrant before searching luggage taken
from an automobile properly stopped and searched for
the
Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve
'

~~~~~r~~~he

~~~ill the

some l\~sion

application of our decision in

United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), to warrantless
searches of luggage seized from automobiles.

1

I

On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little
Rock, Arkansas, Police Department received word from an
informant that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive
aboard an American Airlines flight at gate number one at the
Municipal Airport of Little Rock, Arkansas.

According to the

informant, respondent would be carrying a green suitcase
containing marihuana.

Both Isom and the informant knew

respondent well, as in January of 1976 the informant had given

2.

the Little Rock Police Department information that had led to
respondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana.
Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers
placed the airport under surveillance.

~

predicted, respondent arr1ved
~

a~ ~ . 3~

As the informant had
at gate one.

The police

watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a waiting
taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met a man whom
police subsequently identified as David Rambo.

While Rambo

waited, respondent retrieved from the airline baggage service a
green suitcase matching that described by the informant.
Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went
outside, where he entered the taxi into which he had put his
luggage.

Rambo waited a short while in the airport and then

joined respondent in the taxi, after placing the green suitcase
in the trunk of the vehicle.
When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent,
Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow
officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car,
stopped the vehicle several blocks from the airport.

At the

request of the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his
vehicle, where the officers found the green suitcase.

Without

asking the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to be

3.
9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in ten plastic bags.
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in
2
violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. §82-2617 (1976).

Before trial,

respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under
the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
hearing on January 31, 1977,

and

~

denied the suppression
by a jury on

motion without
February 3, 1977,
in prison

The trial court held a

and ~

to ~ ten years
fined $15,000.

On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed
respondent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should
have suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through
an unlawful search of the suitcase.
704 (1977).

~~~ed
A

States

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403

y.

u.s.

262 Ark. 595, 559 S.W.2d
Chadwick, supra, and
443 (1971), the court

concluded that a warrantless search generally must be supported
by "probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances."
Ark., at 599, 559 S.W.2d, at
court found there 6e

262

In the present case, the

~

~

A

ample probable cause for the police

officers' belief that contraband was contained in the suitcase
they searched.

The court found to be wholly lacking, however,

4.
any exigent circumstance justifying the officers' failure to
secure a warrant for the search of the luggage.

w~~
Ne i th e-r

~~~~

~e~ ~ ~~ there was no danger thatft ~ y eo ~ l e des tr oy

iz=l..
t l're=

c.,;u~f{' ~,t..c_ ~

~~t <l"tfi

a---w ~ PM

LC#&• •

...--cL.t.-4_ ,4, ~

The court concluded,

~a....L-

~.
therefore, that there was "nothing in this set of circumstances
that would lend credence to an assertion of impracticality in
obtaining a search warrant."

Id., at 600.

3

II

~IT/'
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals' privacy and
security in two important ways.

First, it guarantees "[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures."

In addition, this Court has interpreted the

Amendment to include the requirement

~

~4~

that ~

~eAe ~ ai

searches

of private property be performed pursuant to a search warrant
issued in compliance with the warrant clause.

4

See, e.g.,

United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
317 (1972); Almeida-Sanchez · v. United · States, 413 U.S. 266, 277
(1973)(Powell, J., concurring); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33
(1925).

In the ordinary case, therefore, a search of private

property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to a

5.
properly issued search warrant.

The mere reasonableness of a

search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances,
is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required under the
Fourth Amendment.
Court, supra.
403

u.s.

See United States · v. United States District

As the Court said in Coolidge v. - New Hampshire,

443, 481

(1971),

[t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of
our constitutional law for decades, and it has
determined the result in scores and scores of cases
in courts all over this country.
It is not an
inconvenience to be somehow "weighed" against the
claims of police efficiency.
It is, or should be,
an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to
check the "well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive officers" who are a part of any
system of law enforcement.

The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that
individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation
of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and levels of government."

United States · v. United

States District Court, supra, at 317.

By requiring that

conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search
"be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable
assertions of executive authority.

See McDonald

v~

United

~ 4-

r··.._,e ~ ~a-

"
~~~C:::~-~
4.-c.~

5

States, 335 u.s. 451,

(1948).

requirement.

'-f ~~~.,f. ~

-r<-~·::~ ~...__
j a~ aiL~in.ttwJ:a;~ ---Q f

r @~tNr~s-we.i~.l4.i.Ag~ the public intere

~~,i;: ~~u~~ Martinez-Fuerte, 428 u.s.
543, 555 (197~& •H€~ we i gAing A&Qe~arily dema nd s sow e
f ~--- - ~ ••u;-,_

a-f.e ·w-

e-Jloe~tign s

RaJ,T.G~@otO;I

" je-a.l&bl&-ly

a~

5 /.<_/

by the courts to provide for those cases
where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger

~rlto law officers or the risk of Adestruction of evidence, ~
outweigh the

=::~a-:t~(1;~t: i~ ~r~ ~
~lo

magistrate.

See United States v. United States District Court,

supra, at 318.
requirement

But because each exception to the warrant

invariably lfr~o~~aees
j>l»rtJ.- ,;{. ·..,

Amendment

~e:l

'

~~

o.f

~~;;i:u:g

to some extentAthe Fourth

t.ta·~ M

il:Ch&ilt

t.._.d"'-~~~~~

a

fJ f

?s

~

llill--fJeiies

aio~t;gtio n,

~ ·~

the few

'
situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence
of

a warrant have been carefully delineated and "the burden is on
those seeking the exemption to show the need for it."
States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).

United

See Chimel · v.

California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969); Katz v. United States,
supra, at 357.

Moreover, :i:-Ras fl'ltlo€1.-r

w.a rrao t.-- r<e Ef~-i'~ em eu t

A

rs

t As

X' e&~ lt

ba l aHee, the reach of an except ion
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eve15¥ e *'Cep.t:i:-en -to -&he

gf a c ar eful ly
rtH:~ e.t

R.e we r
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~e--e e yeH: e A that
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,

7.

I

uk-..."-f-c•~

which is necessary to accomodate the needs of society.
,.

See

'

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); United States v.
Chadwick,
/\

u.s.

~! ~ 15

(1977);

Coolidge · v~

New Hampshire, 403

443, 455 (1971).
One of the circumstances in which the Constitution

does not require a search warrant is when the police stop an
automobile on the street or highway because they have probable
cause to believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime.
See, e.g., Texas v. · White, 423 U.S. 67, 68 (1975).

As the

Court said in Carroll · v. · United · States, 267 U.S. 132, 153
(1925),
the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches
and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been
construed, practically since the beginning of the
Government, as recognizing a necessary difference
between a search of a store, dwelling house or
other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a
search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile,
for contraband goods, w9ere it is not practicable
to secure a warrant ••••

~~

There are~ two

reasons for the distinction~ between

automobiles and other private property.

First, as the Court

repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles
often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant.

See, e.g.,

United · States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12; Chambers v. Maroney,
399 U.S. 42, 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. · United States, supra.
addition,

WQ. hadHi a:~hanU:Hed

~4~
A

of automobiles

~4a,...,i4-

Q..i.soour•g~

In

) ~ a..-..c.,e...__
t'biit the configuration Cl1"1d history
/\

the substantial expectation¢ of

States · v. Chadwick, supra; South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 368 (1976).
III

the present case, the State argues that the
search of respondent's suitcase was proper under
Carroll and its progeny.
of

~qhat T

luggage

8
'II-A oro ..4-5--

n~

~ /.4,l ~ -

qaEst :i:err bt:1t. tfiat ffttlCS-

i.c ..,U.c .JIIC

#11:&-h

CA44•~• ~-·~ -t.-4

he pol ice i ~ in apprehending respondent and his

. ,;os-~&<'•

'rlffis-,

~II<! f'<rlie~ ample

-.

probable cause

to believe that respondent's green suitcase contained
marihuana.

A previously reliable informant had provided a

detailed account of respondent's expected arrival at the Little
Rock Airport, which account proved to be accurate in every
detail, including the color of the suitcase in which respondent
would be carrying the marihuana.

Having probable cause to

believe that contraband was being driven away in the taxi, the
police were justified in stopping the vehicle, searching it on
the spot, and seizing the suitcase they suspected contained
contraband.

Cfieee~

See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970).

A t oral argument respondent conceded that the stop of

the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally
unobjectionable.

See Tr. of oral argument at 30, 44-46.

The only question, therefore, is whether the police,

9.
rather than immediately searching the suitcase without a
warrant, should have taken it
al~

w4~fi

tfieffi to the police station

with respondent and obtained a warrant for

a~

A j(earchejf of luggage generally

~

th~

~

search.

<l

~~perfo~ur{ ua;t

:o~
a

Jw_~
warrant. AJtlst

~we Te~~s

a~Q

we declined an invitation to

extend the Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting
that neither of the two policies supporting warrantless
searches of automobiles applies to luggage.

d--- !,: ~""""'C-ft-a.w~, ~pi;.i~..

~oe ~Aited

~tates

Here, as in Chadwick, the officers had

seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their control
at the time of the search.

Consequently, "there was not the

slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents could have
been removed before a valid search warrant could be obtained."

'f33 u....s-.
Id., at 13.
1\

~~~

And, as we observed

i ~ .~

hc.L. 's •

luggage, unlike

t"

automobiles, is a common repository for personal effects, and

A

therefore is associated with an expectation of privacy largely
absent with respect to

automobiles ~

The State argues, however, that the warrantless search
of respondent's suitcase was proper,not because the property
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an
automobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street.

In

effect, the State would have us extend Caroll to allow
warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile,

zr--

......

--

~~
as well as of the vehicle itself.)

1 0.

Heretofore we have not had

occasion to rule on the constitutionality of warrantless
searches of luggage taken from automobiles, as challenged
searches generally have been of some integral part of the
automobile.

See, e.g., South · Dakota v. Opperman, 428

u.s.

364,

366 (1976)(glove compartment); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 68
(1975)(passenger compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S.
433, 437 (1973)(trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 44
(1970)(concealed compartment under the dashboard); Carroll · v.
United States, 267

seats).~In

u.s.,

at 136 (behind the upholstering of the

seeking to bring the search of respondent's

~~
suitcase within the exception to the warrant requirement, the
/\

burden is on the State to demonstrate the need for warrantless
searches of luggage properly taken from automobiles ,

%ee

supra,
We find no reason to extend the Carroll

oct:r1ne to

10
as well as of the vehicles themselves.

as the vehicle in which it rides.
the exigency of mobility must be assessed at the point

~
w1t h'1n

.
.
ObJect
to b e searc h ed an d h ave 1t

Llrffizy

A

.
t h e1r

11.

control.

11

See 433

u.s.,

at 13.

Once police have seized a

suitcase, as they did here, the extent of its mobility is in no
way affected by the place from which it was taken.

44-~~~
Accordingly, the ~e is no greater need for warrantless searches
1\

of luggage taken from automobiles than of luggage taken from
other places.

12

Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped

~

on the highway is notAattended by any lesser expectation of

L~~,~.:.k

privacy than is associated with

~r

luggageA

~

Swiefy ~ne

is

~-

not less inclined to placeJ personal p ssessions in a suitcase

~~
merely because the suitcase is to be
Jl ndeed, the very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a
repository for personal items when one wishes to transport

th~

them.

Accordingly,

search

of~ automobilej~ do

4A-

~aken
I\

U#'r

reasons

. .

a-

forA~tf

for the

4-L .... ~

not apply to searches of

by police from automobiles.

~los€4

Because taere

In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the

~
Fourth Amendment applies toAluggage taken from an automobile to
the same degree it applies

~~~~~ .

toj ~fi€~

luggageA

Thus, insofar as

the police are entitled to search such luggage without a

1 2.

warrant, their actions must b

some exception

to the warrant requirement oth r than that applicable to

~-~~
automobiles stopped on the high ay.

\;:I

~ the present caseA the
1\

()-/'-

police, without endangering

elves A risking loss of the

evidence,

have detained

~~~~~
ePl~

secured h1s su1 tease,

~~a.-~~-!"'~
delayed the search) until

after judicial approval had been obtained.

In this way,

respondent's constitutional interest in prior judicial review
of the search would have been fully served.
The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is
Affirmed.

Z.\
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Footnotes
1.

Compare United States v; · Finnegan, 568 F.2d 637, 641-42

(9th Cir. 1977), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F.2d 1175,
1178-79 (8th Cir. 1978)(en bane).
2.

In addition to the marihuana found in the suitcase, police

officers found one ounce of heroin hidden in their patrol car
after transporting Rambo to police headquarters.

Accordingly,

Rambo also was charged with possession of heroin with intent to
deliver.

Immediately before trial on both counts, the court

severed the heroin possession count for later trial.

~~i~ion ,-rhe

~
court rejected the State's contention that
A

luggage is entitled to a lesser protection against warrantless
searches than are other private areas, such as homes.

~

noted that suitcases, unlike automobiles,

repositories for personal effects.

~e

M o re o~rT~~bQ

c~~ ·s

safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the
additional and greater intrusion of a search without a
warrant."

Id., at 601.

See United States

v~ · Chadwick,

433

fn 2.

4.

The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment provides that,

"no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
5.

The need for a carefully drawn, limited warrant for

searches of private premises was the product in large part of
the colonists'

~h:..· (~ 1-

sieeaei~fact±on

*

wieh the writs of assistance to

which they were subjected by the English.

See United · States · v;

Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8 (1977); J. Landynski, Search and
Seizure and the Supreme Court 19 (1966); N. Lasson, The History
and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 51-78 (1937).

Mr. Justice Frankfurter went so far

as to suggest that abuses of the writs of assistance were "so
deeply felt by the Colonies as to be one of the potent causes
of the Revolution."

United States

69 (1950)(dissenting opinion).

v~

Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56,

is understandable,

t erefore, that the Framers wished to make prior
a check on the kind of arbitrary exercise

u.s.

6.

Jones · v. United States, 357

7.

Cou~e~ hwillingness A to excuse the absence of a warrant

~

493, 499 (1958).

v-1~

where spontaneous searches are required of a vehicle on the

I

fn 3.
'V1.--

road has led to what

maR~ fiaoe

"'

called the "automobile

exception" to the warrant requirement, although the exception
does not invariably apply whenever automobiles are searched.
v~

See, e.g., Coolidge

New Hampshire, at 461-62 ("The word

'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears.")
The Automobile Exception:

See generally, Moylan,

What it is and What it is not--A

Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label, 27 Mercer L. Rev. 987
(1976).

d.,,._
8.

~tate~
-A~~ont--e~o~r~
r~t~

~ ~+
b(espondenti

i..fr 1.-J±s

""-

19~ie'&y $ ee

~espsndent's

s~anding . to

~-~.,~ ~~~

Brief for Respondent 3,

~ i:~ii\in

~~~= ~~~~=-~~~s~ ·
-1-o

~~~~~ .

t~~~e

390

u.s.

~~

~~~¥·

377, 387-88 (1968).

See Simmons v. United · States,
Cf.

Rakas

v~ · Illinois,

_
-_
· u.s.~,

lAC-~ ~ ~ .,a... .,.L J.1....._ ~ ~ .,.~
locked footlocker 1\ wbe:rea-e 1:rr 4: ~~ --pTeS"e"ilt case= the ~ e-1 iee
SQa~eaea

g~~

~~
a small, unlocked

"

suitcase.

o?

Although the size of

footlocker in Chadwick made the trunk less mobile, it also

k···
more difficult for

~~
seize A

1-+t· ~.,...

~

police sesYrely to

~ ~r;;;. --"'(..>

'

Moreover, respondent's failure to lock his suitcase did

..J

fn 4.

~ e bag's fundamental character as a
personal effects.

Accordingly, respondent did not

~A

iRY ~~~

relinquish his natural expectation of privacy associated with
the suitcase.

See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz

Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 Mich. L. Rev. 154, 170 (1977).
At the same time, however, we recognize that there may be some
containers seized by police, either within or without an
automobile, for which an owner could not have surrounded by a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
10.

There may be cases in which the special exigencies of the

situation would justify the warrantless search of a suitcase.
Cf.

Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973)(police had reason

to suspect automobile trunk contained a weapon).

Generally,

however, such exigencies will depend upon the contents of the
luggage and the suspect's access to those contents--not upon
whether the suitcase is taken from an automobile.

Moreover, in

the present case the State has conceded that there were no
special exigencies.

See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16.

Nor do we consider the constitutionality of searches of
luggage incident to the arrest of its possessor.
United · States · v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).

See, e.g.,
The State has

not argued that respondent's suitcase was searched incident to
his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not within his

fn 5.
"immediate control" at the time of the search.
11.

The difficulties is seizing and securing automobiles have

led the Court to make special allowances for their search.

See

note 13, infra.
12.

Tss"Q --i-s...~ ~e-ot~~ but that !he pol ice easily could have

-------

obtained a search warrant if they had taken the suitcase to a
magistrate.

They had probable cause to believe not only that

respondent was carrying marihuana, but also that the contraband
was contained in the suitcase that they seized.

,13.

Were we to accept the State's suggestion and extend the

automobile search exception to luggage taken from automobiles
stopped on the street, it would have "the perverse result of
allowing fortuitous circumstances to control" the
constitutionality of such a search.

United States v. Chadwick,

SUP.ra, at 22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

r

Thus, under our

in Chadwick, the police could not have searched the

"""'
suitcase
without a warrant immediately before respondent's tax·
left the curb at the airport.

We see no reason why the need

for a warrant evaporated merely because the vehicle drove a
short distance before it was stopped and the police seized the
suitcase.
Nor are we persuaded by the State's argument that, under
Chambers i1;Jrft<.?"\¥.-"

~9

lJ .S./ 42 ( 1976), if the police were

(

?
I

fn 6.
entitled to seize the suitcase, then they were entitled to
search it~nstead

In Chambers, the Court upheld the

warrantless search of an automobile stopped on the highway by
police who believed that its occupants had robbed a gasoline
station a short time before.

The Court recognized that

"[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be
permitted until a search warrant is obtained •••• "

Id., at 51.

Nonetheless, the Court ruled that a warrantless search was
permissible, as there was no constitutional difference between
the intrusion of seizing and holding the automobile until a
warrant could be obtained, on the one hand, and searching the
vehicle without a warrant, on the other.

W-L-~

G oRt~~He ~~as tio&-o£ ~e

seizure

ofA suitcasef A~

automobile; .

~ e,

however, the

quite different from the seizure

of ~

....,

In Chambers, if the Court had required the

"lesser" intrusion of

a.•c~L ~~•1 ~J;<~c,k 1
it would have imposed a

seizure ~

constitutional requirement upon police departments of all sizes
around the country to have available the people and equipment

-~~~..,_~ h~··~e,L__.
necessary to transport impounded automobiles to some central
(\

location until

l

$

warran \ could be secured.

Moreover, once

seized automobiles were taken from the highway the police would

~
~A location

be responsible for providing some

where they

}

~d-. ._,.-~- "' fl-.~~lfc.-~·¥' s.·~

could be keptl until a magistrate ruled on the application for a
warrant.

~~JJ-4,_,_
Such a constitutional requirement wontd impose ~
J\

~ ~- ~~~~.~..~~~~A,
s~Q.st.c3:R-tiai

~sts

?c4tr:.'---l-

and impositien!!l' on many police departments,

see Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
in

See South · Dakota · v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 379 (Powell, J., concurring);

Note, Warrantless Searches

difficulty:

Suitcases

the present case can be seized and
the police without any substantial intrusion

~~~~~
tLo ~~~~~-~ML-~

Lr/--~~1~ ·

LFP/lab

3/26/79

Rider A, pg. 10

Arkansas

v~ · saunders

\~'\
As noted above, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found our
decision in Chadwick virtually controlling in this case.*
The state contends, however, that Chadwick does not control
because the vehicle in question had remained parked at the
curb where the footlocker had been placed in its trunk and
that therefore no argument was made - and indeed could not
have been made - that the automobile search exception was
applicable.

It is true that this Court has not had occasion

previously to rule on the constitutionality of a warrantless
search of luggage taken from an automobile that had been
lawfully stopped under circumstances in which the automobile
exception normally would be applicable.

Rather, the

decisions to date have involved searches of some integral
part of the automobile.

l)\

. / MThe facts of the two cases are similar in several
critical respects.
In Chadwick, a locked 200-pound
footlocker had been placed 1n the trunk of an automobile at
the time it was seized by police upon probable cause, but
searched without a warrant.
In the present case,
respondent's comparatively small, unlocked suitcase also had
been placed in the trunk of an automobile, and after the
vehicle had driven off, it was stopped lawfully and the
suitcase seized on probable cause and searched without a
warrant. We do not view the difference in size of the
footlocker and suitcase as being material here, nor did
respondent's failure to lock his suticase alter its
fundamental character as a repository for personal, private
effects.

-

LFP/lab
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Rider A, pg.

Arkansas

v~

Saunders

17-1'1-'?7
Note · to · David:
We took this case to clarify the meaning of
Chadwick.

On its facts, this presents an easy case.

The

article in question is personal luggage - a suitcase of the
type traditionally used to transport personal belongings
with respect to which one has a high degree of expectation
of privacy.
I

But as Justice Blackmun's dissent from denial of
cert indicates (9/27/78), the difficulty will be in
determining what type of "container" found in an automobile
lawfully stopped, and believed to contain a controlled
substance, or other contraband,
luggage?

is to be treated like

We know from our own experience that people

transport almost every conceivable kind of object, packaqe,
box and container in automobiles, and particularly in the
type of vans that now are so popular.
It is necessary for us to add a footnote
addressing this problem.
Paul undertook a draft.

I would appreciate it if you and
We certainly should not undertake

to render advisory opinions as to the types of packages or
containers that come within the "luggage" rule.

Perhaps all

we can do is recognize that serious linedrawing problems
will exist, and that courts simply will have to apply the
principles we have established.

The more obvious ones

2.
include the "plain view" doctrine.

Under prior cases, the

automobile search exception allows police to look into the
trunk, glove compartment, under the carpet, etc.
is found in "plain view" may be seized.

Whatever

With respect to the

more difficult question of packages, parcels, containers and
the like that require opening before the contents can be
known for sure, the only principle that comes to mind at the
moment is w,hether there is a reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to the particular item.

If, for

example, there is a container - say, a tool kit - that
customarily is used for burglary equipment, there would be
no expectation of privacy.

Nor, if a gun were found in

searching the automobile, a box in the trunk that reasonably
might contain ammunition probably could be seized and
examined on the spot.
I suppose there is little expectation of privacy
with respect to packages wrapped at a store and being
transported, say, to one's residence.

There would be only a

limited privacy interest in something one had purchased, and
had it wrapped by the salesman, for the purpose of
transporting it horne.

But it would be quite difficult for

police, on the spot, to make judgments of this type.
I suppose that in most situations, consent to
search would be obtained rather than have the automobile and
all of its contents impounded.

But whereever narcotics or

3.
contraband materials are within packages in an automobile
trunk, I suppose our holding in Saunders will require - at
least in most instances - that the warrant clause be
applied.
I hope you can come up with some artful writing.

LFP/lab

3/26/79

Rider A, FN 5

Arkansas · v~

Saunders

j
-

l~

21

It was argued by the state that, in these

circumstances, it merely inconvenienced all concerned including respondent - to defer searching the suitcase until
it could be carried to a stationhouse and a warrant
obtained.

If respondent had in fact objected on the grounds

of this type of "inconvenience", he could have avoided it by
consenting to the search.

LFP/lab

3/26/79

Rider A , pg • 1 1

Arkansas · v~

Saunders

I
We therefore find no justification for the extension of
Carroll and its progeny to the warrantless search of ones
personal luggage merely because it was located in an
automobile lawfully stopped by the police.

...

lll
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Rider A, pg. 4

Arkansas · v. Saunders

Note to David:

Part II of the draft launches immediately into a
summary of familiar Fourth Amendment principles.
be the best way to commence Part II.

This may

But, as Justice White

pointed out at our Conference (see my notes), and also see
his dissertt from denial of cert, we are "drawing lines" in
these Fourth Amendment cases, often with little "principle"
supporting the distinction.

Moreover, prior to Chadwick, I

believe the lower courts uniformly extended the automobile
execption to include the contents of luggage found within an
automobile properly stopped.
In view of these considerations, perhaps a
preliminary paragraph or two might be appropriate - to be
added on page 4 of the draft.

The dictation that follows is

merely one possible mode of introduction - and one that I
have had no opportunity to "polish".

It may, however, give

you some idea as to a more artful introduction.

You and

Paul should feel free to suggest alternatives or to
recommend that we add nothing as a preference to the
discussion of the familiar principles in Part II.

*

*

*

*

2.

II

The reports of this Court are replete with
decision in which we have been asked to vindicate Fourth
Amendment rights.
time and again.

The relevant principles have been stated
Yet, claims of entitlement to suppress

highly relevant evidence continue to occupy the attention of
federal and state courts at all levels.

The difficulty is

that factual variations seems almost infinite, and often it
is difficult for law enforcement and for the courts to know
whether a particular variation brings the case within or
without the protection of the amendment.

This, at least on

the surface, is such a case.
Only two Terms ago, in Chadwick, we held that a
locked footlocker, seized on probable cause after loaded
into the trunk of a motor vehicle, but prior to its being
driven away, could not properly be searched without a
warrant.

In earlier cases (Chambers and Carroll), under

what has become known as the automobile exception to the
warrant clause, the Court has sustained the validity of
warrantless searches of automobile and their contents upon a
showing of probable cause.

This case, arguably, could be

controlled either by Chadwick or by the Chambers/Carroll
line of precedence.

We thus are presented with the familiar

3.
necessity of linedrawing in a Fourth Amendment case.
believe, upon careful analysis, this can be done on a
principled basis.
First, we summarize the familiar principles.

We
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I return herewith the first draft of 3/21/79, as
edited by Paul, of my opinion in this case.
As you will note, I have subjected it to rather
extensive editing - perhaps the reflexive response of being
too weak to edit with greater care and finesse.
The same may be said about the riders I have
dictated on a couple of taps that should be given to Sally
first thing Monday morning.
I think we have the substance of a sound opinion,
and hope we can move it forward to a first opinion draft by
the end of this week.
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MR. JusTICE STEVENS, concurring in the judgment.
Having improvidently granted certiorari. the Court now
improvidently decides a question that is not presented by this
case.
The question that is presented by the State's certiorari petition is frivolous. Because the police had probable cause to
believe that respondent's green suitcase contained marihuana
before it was placed in the trunk of the taxicab. their duty to
obtain a warrant before opening it was clear. United States
v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1. The State's attempt to distinguish
Chadwick is properly rejected by the Court in a footnote. See
n. 9, ante.
The question the Court chooses to decide is quite different
from the one presented by petitioner: whether a warrant is
necessary before opening luggage when the police have probable cause to believe contraband is located somewhere in a
vehicle, but when they do not know ·whether, for example, it
is inside a piece of luggage in the trunk. in the glove compartment. or concealed in some part of the car's structure. I
am not sure whether that would be a stronger or weaker case
for requiring a warrant before the luggage is opened. but T am
sure that it would be better for the Court to have thC' question
argued before deciding it.
Rather than joining the Court's advisory opinion. 1 concur
in its judgment for the reasons stated by the Supreme Court
of Arkansas,
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[April-, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of tbe Court.
This case presents the questi<;m whether, in the absence of
exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant
before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly
stopped and searched for contraband. We took this case by
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve
some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our
decision in .United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), to
-warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles. 1
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Compare United States v. Finnegan, 568 F. 2d 637, 641-642 (CA9
1977), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F. 2d 1175, 1178-1179 (CAS 1978)
(en bane).
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On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock,
Ark., Police Department received word from an informant
that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an
American Airlines flight at gate number one
the Municipal
Airport of Little Rock, Ark. According to the informant,
respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing
marihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent
well, as in January of 1976 the informant had given the Little
Rock Police Department information that had led to respondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana.
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Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers
placed the a.i rport under surveillance. As the informant had
predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate one. The police
watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a
waiting taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met
a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo.
While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline
baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by
the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which
he had put his luggage. Rambo waited a short while in the
a~rport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing ·
the green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle.
,When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent,
Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow
officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car, stopped
the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of
the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle,
where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking
the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to
be 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags.
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in viola..
tion of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-2617 ( 1976). 2 Before trial,
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under
·the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court
held a hearing on January 31, 1977, and denied the suppression motion without explanation. After respondent's convic2 In addition to the marihuana found in the suitcase, police officers
found one ounce of hrroin hidden in their patrol car after transporting
Rambo to police headquarters. Accordingly, Rambo also was charged
with possc:osion of heroin with intent to deliver. Immediately before trial
on both counts, the court severed the heroin possession count for later
trial.
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tion by a jury on February 3, 1977, he was sentenced to 10
years in prison and was fined $15,000.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed respondent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have
suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through
-- ---- ' f '1'1' c;Pitrase.
262 Ark. 595, 559 S. W.

of impracticality in obtaHllH!; "'
at 600, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706. 3
II

~- -

Despite our repeated attempts to set forth the basic princi
ples applicable to claims of Fourth Amendment violations,
requ
r the su J ression of hi hi relevant evidenc
ti u to occupy much of the attention o courts at all levels of
the state and federal judiciary. ~ _g,o urts and law enforcea "With the suitcase safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and gr<'ater intn1sion of a searrh without a warrant."
262 Ark. 595, 601, 559 S. W. 2d 704 , 707. The court also rejected the
State's rontC'ntion that luggag<' is entitled to a lesser protection against
warrantless searches than are other private areas, surh as homes. It noted
that suitcases, unlike automobiles, customarily are the repositories for personal effects.

l'l
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diffieult,is.g. Only
two Terms ago, we held that a locked footlocker could not
lawfully be searched without a warrant, even though it had
been loaded into the trunk of an automobile parked at a curb.
United States v. Chadwick, supra. In earlier cases, on the
other hand, the Court sustained the constitutionality of warrantless searches of automobiles and their contents under what
has become known as the "automobile exceptio '
ee. e. g.,
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Carroll v . .United
tates,
. S. 132 ( 1925). ¥'determining whether the warrantless search of respondent's suitcase falls on the Chadwick
or the Chambers/Carroll side of the Fourth Amendment lin •·----·,

.

.

demar ing the scope of individuals' pFirae.y:(' Although this ~
line must be drawn meticulously, we believe it to be based ~,_,
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44uni*Rr. The Fourth Amendment j A"~ ~.J~- 
protec~.inat-viGI~s' privacy and security..(in two important C.-, ,_, ---ways. First, it guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be - - - - - - - - secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." In addition, this Court
has interpreted the amendment to wlude the requirement that 1\
normally searches of private property be performed pursuant
to a seach warrant issued in compliance with the warrant
clause. 4 See, e. g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 390
(1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1, 9 (1977);
&J:Q

4 The warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment providPs that, "no War- '
rants shall 'issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describin the lace to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized."
~~...-...-c ~

...

4 1-kt.- /)...~ ~ ~ ~~~~_..,.r-:(
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United States v. United States District Court, 407 U. S. 297,
317 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967);
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33 (1925). In the
ordinary case, therefore, a search of private property must be
both reasonable and performed pursuant to a properly issued
~h warrant. The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed
in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required under the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. United States District
Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971),
"[t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our
constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this
country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow
'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or
should be, an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to check the
'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement."
The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation
of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and levels of government." United States v. United
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search
"be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) , we minimize the risk of unreasonable
assertions of executive authority. See McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451,455-456 (1948). 5
The need for a carefully drawn, limited warrant for searches of private
premises was the product in large part of the colonists' resentment of the
5

77-1497-0PINION
6

ARKANSAS v. SANDERS

Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the warrant
requirement. These have been established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility in the
application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a
prerequisite for a search. See United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). Thus, a few "jealously and
careful1y drawn" 6 exceptions provide for those cases where the
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law
officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh
the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistate. See
United States v. United States District Court, supra, at 318.
But because each exception to tho warrant requirement invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search
may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been
carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it." ·United States v. Jeffers,
342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951). See Chirnel v. ·California, 395 U.S.
752, 762 (1969); Katz v. United States, supra, at 357. More- ~
over, we have limited the reach of ~exception to that whic~
is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society.
See Mincey v. Arizona, supra, at 393; United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 15 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra,
at 455.
One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile
on the street or highway because they have probable cause to
writs of ass:stance to which they were subjected by the English. See
United States v. Chadwirlc, 433 U. S. 1, 8 (1977); J . Landynski, Search
and ScizurP and the Supreme Court 19 (1966); N. Lasson, The History
and Development of the Fourth AmPnclment to the United States Constitution 51-78 ( 1937). Mr. Justice Frankfurter went so far as to suggest that abuses of the writs of assistance were "so deeply felt by the
Colonies as to be one of the potent causes of the Revolution." United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U. S. 56, 69 (1950) (eli ·senting opinion).
6 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).

,
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believe it contains contraband;9r7 evidence of a crime/\\ See
.United States v. Martinez-F'uerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561-562
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 (1975);
Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67, 68 (1975). As the Court said
in Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925),
"the guaranty of frredom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the beginning of the Government, as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile 1
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant. . . . " 7

~0 .
......--

There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between
automobiles and other private property. First, as the Court
repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See,
e. g., United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 12; Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S., 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
------_,'<!'"-_ ___.:su
~~r.:a:.:..
: · ~I;n:._::
addition, the configuration, use, and regulation of ~
~1..~. J. .J/~~
automobiles
e the ran ~aBitsJ expec~a 10n o privacy that L
~
often exists with respect to ai:fferently swated property. See"
Rakas v. Illinois,- U. S. - , - (1978) (PowELL, J., concurring); United States v. Chadwick, supra; South Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976).
7 The willingness of courts to excuse the absence of a warrant where
spontaneous searches are required of a vehicle on the road has led to what
is called the "automobile exception" to the warrant requirem0nt, although
the exception does not invariabl~r apply whenever automobiles are sear:ched
Sec, e. g., Coolidge v. New Ilampshire, ~ 461-462-0"The wo;d 'm~mobilc'
is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears."). See generally Moylan, The Automobile Exception:
What it is and What it is not-A Rationale in Search of a Clearer Label,
27 Mercer L. Rev. 987 (1976).
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III
In the present case, the State argues that the warrantless
search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and
its progeny. 8 The police acted properly-indeed commendably-in apprehending respondent and his luggage. They
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant
had provided a detailed account of respondent's expected
arrival at the Little Rock Aiport, which account proved to be
accurate in every detail, including the color of the suitcase in
which respondent would be carrying the marihuana. Having
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven
away in the taxi, the police were justified in stopping the
vehicle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the suitcase they
suspected contained contraband. See Chambers v. Maroney,
supra, at 52. At oral argument respondent conceded that the
stop of the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg. , at 30, 44- 46.
The only question, therefore, is whether the police, rather
than immediately searching the suitcase without a warrant,
should have taken it to the police station with respondent
and obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of
luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a warrant. In Chadwick we declined an invitation to extend the
'Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting that neither
of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of automobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their
control at the time of the search. Consequently, "there was
not the slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could
8 R espondent concedes that th e suitcase was his property, see Brief for
R espondent 3, and so there is no question of his standing to rhallrnge the
search. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 387- 388 (1968).
Cf. Rakas v. Illinois,- U.S.-,- (1978).
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be obtained." 433 U. S., at 13. And, as we observed in that
case, luggage, unlike automobiles, is a common repository for
one's personal effects, and therefore is associated with an
expectation of privacy largely absent with respect to automobiles. Ibid.
~~
The State argues,
r, that the warrantless search o
respondent's suitcase was proper, not because the property
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an
3Jutomobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street. In
effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile,
as well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas found our decision in Chadwick virtually
controlling in this case. 0 'l'he State contends, however, that
dhadwick does not control because in that case the vehicle had
remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been
placed in its trunk and that therefore no argument was made
that the automobile search exception was applicable. This
Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitutionality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from an
automobile lawfully stoppec~.mdeP eiPeM!'RB*t:tHces in which bhe (
automobile exception nGrmaUy w:ouhl be a;ppli6aWe/ Rather,
the decisions to date have involved searches of some integral
part of the automobile. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Opperman,
428 U. S. 364, 366 (1976) (glove compartment); Texas v.
0 The facts of the two cases are similar in several critical respects.
In
Chadwick, a locked, 200-pound footlocker was searched without a warrant
after the police, acting with probable cause, had taken it from the trunk
1----;o~" automobile. In the present case, respondent's comparatively small,
unlocked suitcase also had been placed in the trunk of an automobile and
was searched without a warrant by police acting upon probable cause. We
do not view the difference in the sizes of the footlocker and suitcase as
material here; nor did respondent's failure to lock his suitcase alter its
fundamental character as a repository for personal, private effects. Cf.
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76
Mich. L. Rev. 154, 170 (1977).
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White, 423 U. S. 67. 68 (1975) (passenger compartment);
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433, 437 (1973) (trunk);
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42, 44 (1970) (concealed
compartment under the dashboard); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S., at 136 (behind the upholstering of the scats).
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage
properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the
trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the
search-after the police have seized the object to be searched
and have it securely within their controP 0 See 433 U. S., at
i3. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did ·here, the
extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from
which it was ta'ken. 11 Accordingly, as a general rule there is
no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from
automobiles than of luggage taken from other places. 12
10

The difficulties is seizing and securing automobiles have led the Court
to make special allowances for their search. Seen. 14, infra.
11
There may be cases in which t'he special exigencies of the situation
would justify the warrantless search of a suitcase. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 433 (1973) (police had reason to suspect automobile trunk
contained a weapon). Generally, however, such exigencies will depend
upon t e contents of . the luggage and the suspect's access to those con- .
tents-not upon whether the ·
s a en rom an au ·omo 1 e. ~
~ 6·• ~T! ,W the present case the State has concecled that there were no special
exigencies. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 16.
Nor do we cons:der t hr constitutionality of searches of luggage incident
to the arrest of its pos~essor. See, e. g., United States v. Robinson, 414
U. S. 218 (1973). The State has not argued that respondent's suitcase
was searched incident to his arrest, and it appears that the bag was not
within his "immediate control" at the tjme ofJ'he=iear.ph
•1
pohce easily could have obtained a search warrant if they had
tnklin the suitcase to a magiRtrate. They had probablr cause io believe
not only that respondent was carrying marihuana, but also that 1he contraband was contained in the suitcase that they seized. The State argues
·that under the clrcumst:mces of this case inconvenience to all concerned

$;he
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Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on
the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from
other locations. One is not less inclined to place priva.te,
personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase
is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by
other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the·
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for
personal items when one wishes to transport them. 1 3 Accordingly, the reasons for not requiring a warrant for the search of
an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage
taken by police from automobiles. We therefore find no
justification for the extension of Carroll and its progeny to the
warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it
was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police. 14

~

r\)J

j;(l!,

~ot

would have been thr only result of deferring search of the suitcase until a
warrant was obtained. Those in respondent's position who find such inconvenience unacceptable, 9£ Q8l!IW'\ ~'S may avoid it y consenting to
the search.
13 Not all containers and packages found by police during the course of
a search will dE'serve the full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
some containers (for, example gun casef) by their very nature cannot
support any reasonable expectation of privacy because their contents can
be inferred from their outward appearance. Similarly, in some cases the
contents of a package will be open to "plain view," thereby obviating the
need for a warrant. See Harris v. United States, 390 U. S. 234, 236
(1968) (p er curiam). There will be difficulties in determining which parcel taken from an automobile require a warrant for their search and
which do not. Our drcision in this case means only that a warrant enerally is required before personal luggage can be searche that the extent
to which the Fourth Amendment appli es to other parce s epen s not at
a UJ)On w 1et er t>4.e ~ are seized from an automobile.
l~~P~@ persuadE'd by the State's argument that, under Chamber '
if the police were pntitled to seize thr suitcase, then they were entitlrd to
se:nrh it. In Chambers, the Court uphrld the warrantless search of an
automobile stopped on the highway by police who believed that its occupants had robbed a gnsoline station a short time before. The Court recognized that "[a]rguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's

r--

~ ~ -~
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In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other
locations. Thus, insofar as the police are entitled to search
such luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified
under some exception to the warrant requirement other than
that applicable to automobiles stopped on the highway.
Where-as in the present case-the police, without endangering themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have
detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his
suitcase, they should delay the sea.rch thereof until after judi- /
- - - - -cial approva~ been obtained. In this way, tffiS}'leets' 6 constitutional i.ntQrssts m pnor JU 1c1a rev1ew o searc es w1
~J:.ti, ~
be fully served.
~
The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a
search warrant is obtained .. .. " !d., at 51. Nonetheless, the Court
there was no constituruled that a warrantle~s search was permi~sible,
tional difference between the intrusion of seizing and holding the automobile until a warrant could be obtained, on the one hand, and searching the
vehicle without a warrant, on the other.
We view, however, the seizure of a suitcase as quite different from the
seizure of an automobile. In ChambeTs, if the Court had required 4e--f
~~seizure and holding of the vehicle, it would have
imposed a constitutional requirement upon police departments of all siz·es
around the country to have available the people and equipment necessary (
., to transport impounded automobiles 1'!~HrBeFiRg Benretimee -in the htlii!
aFeelw...,to soma central location until warrants could be secured. Moreover, once seized automobiles were taken from the highway the police
would be responsible for providing some appropriate location where they
could be kept, with due regard to the safety of the vehicles and their
contents, until a magistrate ruled on the application for a warrant. Such
a constitutional requirement therefore would have imposed severe)~
~eas even impossibl~ burdens~n many police departments. See Note,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 835,
841-842 ( 197 4). No comparable burdens are likely to exist with respect
to the seizure of personal luggage .
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January 5, 1979 Conference
Supplemental List
Motion for Appointment of
Counsel

No. 77-1497
ARKANSAS

v.
SANDERS
(Resp's motion to proceed

if£ is on p. 21 of this

Conference.)
Jack T. Lassiter, Esq., seeks to be appointed to represent
resp.

His law partner, William McArthur, represented resp at

trial and on appeal, and filed the

if£ motion.

Mr. Lassiter

was admitted to practice-fn Ark. in 1973, and to the bar of
this Court in June 1978.
before CA 8.

Jr-ee

W/J

He has argued a number of cases

- 2 Although Mr. Lassiter appears qualified, because of
apparent neglect by his firm when the Court requested a
response to the cert petn, I am not sure he should be
appointed.

On June 6, the Clerk wrote to Mr. Arthur requesting

a response by July 6.

On July 13, the Clerk again wrote asking

why no respnse had been filed.

The Clerk advises that he

received no response to this letter either.

It was only after

the Court granted cert, that the attorneys contacted the
Court.

Although Mr. Lassiter has already filed his brief on

the merits (typewritten), I would not appoint him until he has
adequately explained the lack of response to the Clerk's
letters.
1/2/79
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January 5, 1978 Conference
List 5, Sheet 4
No. 77-1497
ARKANSAS
Motion of resp for leave
to proceed further herein
ifp.

v.
SANDERS
Cert was granted on October 10.
apparently did not file a response.

Although requested, resp
See Oct. 2, 1978 Con£., p. 8.

Through counsel in the court below, who does not know resp's
present whereabouts or financial condition, resp asks to proceed
ifp.

He was so permitted by the Ark. SC, and counsel attaches

resp's June 1978 affidavit which states that since his release from
prison he has had no substantial employment and that he has no
money or property , except an interest in the home awarded to his
former wife in their divorce.
This is a criminal case, and resp apparently was in prison for
some time.

In view of the finding of indigency below, updated at

least to June 1978, it would seem that this motion should be granted.
12/19/78
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Bruce

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

No. 77-1497 Arkansas v. Sanders

Date:

January 29, 1979

I believe we took this case because it appeared
that the Arkansas Supreme Court had unduly extended
Chadwick.
Police had probable cause (based on a reliable
informer's information) to believe that respondent was
bringing narcotics into the Little Rock airport.

The

suitcase containing the drugs was described by the
informant.

Police "tailed" respondent upon his arrival, and

when the suitcase was placed in a cab that drove away, the
cab was stopped and searched.

--

The suitcase, unlocked, was

found in the trunk of the car, and thereupon it was
searched.

It did in fact contain narcotics.
Although it was conceded that there was probable

cause to stop the automobile and perhaps to search open and
visible areas thereof, the Arkansas Supreme Court purporting to apply Chadwick, held that the police had no
right to open the unlocked suitcase.

They should have

carried it to the police station and obtained a search
warrant.

------------------~.~--~---------

1 ,. ..

2.

In a rather intemperate brief,

~he

attorney

general of Arkansas argues that the "automobile exception"
to the warrant requirement applies.

He contends that there

The case is difficult because of the conflict
between the practicalities and legal theory.

Once the car

was stopped, pursuant to probable cause based on it being
the vehicle in which the suitcase was being transported, it
is clear that at least the police would have been justified
in detaining the car and suitcase until they coulq obtain a
warrant.

Alternatively, they could have taken the suitcase

to headquarters and not opened it until they had obtained a
warrant.

In the circumstances of this case, it was a

certainty that a warrant would issue.

Therefore, it can

b~

argued that it is irrational to suppress the critical
:r

evidence merely because the police did not follow the rule
book when the result would have been the same in any event.
Nor was the privacy of respondent invaded any more by
opening the suitcase at the scene of the stop than it would
have been at headquarters after a warrant had been obtained.
So much for the practical aspects of the case.
the theoretical side, if it is conceded that the suitcase
could have been seized and taken to headquarters for the
purpose of obtaining a warrant, there
circumstances" requiring them to open

no "exigent

~.

.
3.

the stor;>.

Thus, the case could be written along these

lines.
A brief, summary bench memo would be welcome, but
it is not necessary.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77- 1497
State of Arkansas, Petitioner,

I

On Writ of Certiorari to th~
Supreme Court of Arkansas.

v.

Lonnie James Sanders.

[April - , 1979]
MR. JusncE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether, in the absence of
exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant
before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly
stoppeJ and searched for contraband. We took this case by
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve
some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our
decision in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977), to
warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles.1

I
On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock,
Ark .. Police Department received word from an informant
that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an
American Airlmes flight at gate number one of the Municipal
Airport of Little Rock. Ark. According to the informant.
respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing
marihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent
well . as in January of 1976 the informant had given the Little
Rock Police Department information that had led to respondent's arrest and conviction for possessioH of marihuana.
1 Compare U mted States v. fi'mnegan. 56R F . 2d 6:37, 641-642 (CA9
1977) , w1th United State~J v. Stevie . 5R2 F . 2d 1175, 1178-1179 (CAS 1978)

(en bane )
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.Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other policP officers
placed the airport under surveillance. As the informant had
predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate one. The police
watched as respondent deposited some hand luggage in a
waiting taxicab, retumed to the baggage claim area, and met
a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo.
While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline
baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by
the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which
he had put his luggage. Rambo waited a short while in the
airport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing
tlw green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle.
When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent,
Rambo, and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow
officers gave pursuit and. with the help of a patrol car, stopped
the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of
the police. the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle,
where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking
the permission of either respondent or Rambo. the police
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to
bP 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags.
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 82-2617 (1976). 2 Before trial,
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
suitcase, contending that the search violated his rights under
the l<'""om·th and Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court
held a hearing on January 31, 1977, and denied the suppression motion without explanation. After respondent's convic~ In addition to thr marihttllllll found in the ~tt!lca~e, policr officers
l'uuud one ounce of heroin hidden in their patrol car after tran~porting
Rambo to police headquarters. Accordingly, Hambo abo wa~ charged
with pos;:;es~ion of hrroin with int!:'nt to deliver. lmmrdiately beforr trial
ou both counts, the court srvercd_ the lwroin I?O&ir~ion count, fill'· later.·
tri!ll .
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tion by a jury on February 3, 1977, he was sentenced to 10
years in prison and was fined $15,000.
On appeal the Supreme Court o.f Arkansas reversed respondent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have
suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through
an unlawful search of the suitcase. 262 Ark. 595. 559 S. W.
2d 704 (1977). Relying upon United Stntes v. Chadwick,
supra, and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971),
the court concluded that a warrantless search generally must
be supported by "probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances." 262 Ark., at 599. 559 S. W. 2d, a.t 706. In the
present case, the court found there was ample probable cause
for the police officers' belief that contraband was contained in
the ~uitcase they searched. The court found to be wholly
lacking, however, any exigent circumstance justifying the
officers' failure to secure a warrant for the search of the luggage. With the police in control of the automobile and its
occupants, there was no danger that the suitcase and its
contents would be rendered unavailable to due legal process.
The court concluded. therefore, that there was "nothing in this·
set of circumstances that would lend credence to an assertion
of impracticality in obtaining a search wat·rant. " 262 Ark.,
at 600, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706. 3

II
Although the general principles applicable to claims of
Fourth Amendment violations are well settled. litigatiou over·
requests for suppression of highly relevant evideuce continues
to occupy much of the attention of courts at all levels of the·
st9.te and federal judiciary. Courts and law enforcement
3 " With the suitcHsf' safrly immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertake the additional and greater intrwsion of a search without a warrant."·
26.2 Ark . 595, 601, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 707. The court also rejected the
StatP's cont ention that luggage is entitled to a le:,:~;er protection against
warrantle~SlS searclw:; than are other private area,;, ~uch as homes. It noted'
that suitcases, unlike aut omouil~, customarily ane bbe tepositories for per-

~l'I!HD e.OCecl!s.
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officials often fiml it difficult to discern thr proper application
thesC' principks to individual cases, bf'cause tlH' circumstances
giving rise to suppression r<'quests can vary almost i1lfinitely.
Moreover, an apparf'ntly small differNICC' in the factual situa.tion frequpntly is vir-vved as a con trolling cliffcrPnce in determining Fourth Amendment rights. The pn'SC'IIt casC' presents
an example. Only two Terms ago. we held that a locked footlocker could not lawfully be sC'arched without a warrant, even
though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile
parked at a curb. l'm:ted States v. Chadtm:ck, supra. In
earlier cases, 011 the other hand. the Court sustained the constitutionality of warrau tkss srarches of automobiles and
their contents under what has become known as thr "automobile exception' ' to the warrant requirement. See. e. g., Chambers Y. Maroney, 3n9 ( T. S. 42 ( 1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 P. S. 132 ( 1025). \YP thus are presentPd with the task
of determining whether the warrantless search of respondent's
suitcase falls on the C:hadurick or the Chambers/ Carroll side
of the Fourth Amendmt>nt line. Although in a sense this is
a line-drawing process. it must be guided by established
J ,ri11ciples.
We conunpnce with a summary of these principles. The
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security of persous in two important ways. First, it guarantees " [ t] he right
of the people to bf' secure in their persons. houses, papers, and
effects. against unrPasonable searches and seizures." Tn additiou, this Court has intt>rprPted the amendment to include the
rf'quirement that normally searches of private property be
performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance
with tht> warraut Clause. 4 See, e. g., Miucey v. Arizona, 437
1 Thc warrant clau8<' of tlw Fourth AmPndmPnt providE>~ that, "no War- '
rant,; ~hall i~suE>, but upon probable rattH<', ~upported by Oath or affirmalwn, 1llld

particularl~r de~cribing

the place to bP

~earched

and the per:sons

or thing~ to be seized." The Fourth AmE>tldnwnt haH lw('l1 mndr fully
applicabl e lo th(' 8tatr·~ hy lhl' Funrt('c·nth Anwnrlm(·nt ~('<' Mapp v~
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1T. k . 385. 390 (1978); ['nited States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 9 (1977); [~nited States v. United States D·istrict Co·urt,
407 P. S. 297.317 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967); Ag11ello \·. U nded States, 269 e. S. 20. 33
(1925). In the ordinary case, therefore. a search of private
property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to
a properly issued search warrant. The mere reasonableness
of a search , assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required
under the Fourth Amendment. See [ 'nited States v. United
States District Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v.
Ne1r Hampshire, 403 L'. S. 443,481 (H)71),
" [t]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our
constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this
country. It is not an inconvenience to be t~omehow
'weighed ' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or
should be. an important working part of our machinery of
government. operating as a matter of course to check the
' well-mtentiolled but mistakenly overzealous executive
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement."
The promment place the warrant requirement IS given in our
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separatiou
of powers and division of functions among the different
branches and levels of government.' ' United States v. United
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search
" be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged m the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime, " Johnso·n v. Un ·ited States,
3:~3 U.S. 10, 14 (1948 ) , wt:' minimize the risk of unreasonable
Ohw , :~m lT. S. 64:1 (196]); Wulf v. Colorado. :t3b L S. 25 (HJ49). In
tJm; opmion we refer to 1 hr Fourth Arnendmrut aH 11 ~o applw~ to thO'
~'tu 1P ot A rkan~a:-
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assrrtions of executivr authority. Sre McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948):'
Nonetheless, there are somr rxceptions to the warrant
requirrment. These havr been Pstablished wherr it was concluded that the public interrst required some flexibihty in the
application of thE:' general rule that a valid warrant is a.
prrrequisite for a search. Sec United States v. MartvnezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543. 555 (1976). Thus, a few "jealously and
carefully drawn" u excE:'ptious provide for those cases where the
societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law
offie<'rs OJ' the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh
the reasons for prior recomse to a neutral mag1state. See
U11tted States v. C·nited States D·istrict Court, supra, at 318.
But because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impmges to some extent on the protective purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, the few situatious in which a search
may be conductPd in tiH' absence of a warrant have been
carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the
Pxemption to show the need for it.'' United States v. Jeffers,
342 P. S. 48. 51 (1951). ~ee Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 762 ( 1969); Katz v. United States, supra, at 357. Moreover. we have limited thP reach of each exception to that which
is npcessary to accommodate the identified needs of society.
~ ee Mincey v. Arizona, t,'Upra, at 393; United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 1.5 (1977) ; Coolidye v. Xew Hampshire, supra,
at 455
; The IH:'l>d for a carrfull~· drawn, limitt>d warrant for ~earehP,.; of private
pr<•mi::;es wa~ th<:> product Ill largr part of the eolonist~' reHentmrnt of the
writ~ of a~~i;;htn<'<' to whieh tll('y wc·re ~11hjeetPd by the Eng l i~h. Se~
Uwtf'd States v. Chculu•icl.·. 4:3:~ U. S. 1, g (1977); .r. Landyn~ki. Searclt
und Seiz11n• and tlw Suprrnw Comt 19 (l91i6) ; N. La~~un. Tlw History
nnd Dc•velopm<:>nt of the Fomth AmPndmml to tlw l ' nitPd StatP~ Con~tltllfton 51-iR (19:{7). :\fr. Juliticl' .Frankfurt<•r went ,.:o far a:s to ,;ugge~t that abuse~ of the writ~ of a~,;t~tancl' wen• ·',o dPeply felt by thP
ColomE'~ a,; to be OJW of the potent eausrs of the H<•vohtttou." Unttect
State11 r . Rabinowitz. 339 r. S. 56, li9 (1950) (di~"enting opmiou) .
0

.f.O!II'S \ .

United States, 31>7 t'. R 49;{, -!9\:l (1958) ..
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One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile
on the street or highway because they have probable cause to
believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See
United States ·v. N/(trtinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543, 561-562
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891. 896 (1975);
Texas v. White, 423 U. S. (i7, 68 (1975). As the Court said
in Carroll v. Un·i ted States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925),
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed,
practically since the hegiHning of the Government, as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
store, dwelling house or othet· stmcture in respect of
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship. motor boat, wagon or automobil~
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a warrant. . . ." 7
There are essentially two reasons for the distinction between
automobiles and other priva.te property. First, as the Court
repeatedly has recognized , the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable . to obtain a warrant. See,
e. g., United States v. Chadurick, supra, at 12; Chambers v.
1~laroney, 399 U. S., 49-50 ( 1970); Carroll v. Umted States,
t.vupra . ln addition. the configuration. use, and regulation of
automobiles substantially dilutes the reasonable expectation
of privacy that often exists with t·espect to differently situated
]li'Operty. Hee Rakas v. Illinois, U . S. - - , (1978)
of rourt~ to rxcu~<' the ab~enc(' of a warmnt where
are rrquirrd of H vduclc on thr road ha8 !rei to what
i~ ('alled the "nutomobil<• rxccptwn " to the warmnt requirmwnt, although
iht' PXCt:']>tJon dor~ not mvarinbl~· appl~· whrnrver automobJie~ are ~earched.
SP<·, e. f/ .. Coo!idgl' v. New Ha111pshu·!', 403 ll. S. Hi!, 4(il-462 (1971)
("TIH' word ' a<~tomollll<' ' 1~ not n tali~nmn 111 who~P pn'.~P!Jel' tlw .Fourth
Amendmrnt fadr' away and di~appPars. " ). Sre gt-urrally :VIoylau , The
Autonwhil<' Exerpt1011 : What it i~ and What it 1~ 11ot-A Ratwnalr iu.
Rt•:m·IJ of n Ck:H'Pl' LHbrl, 21 :\IP!'!'PI' L. Rrv 987 ( .1971)}.
7

Tlw

wilhngnr~s
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J .. concurring); r·nited States\', Chadwick, ~;upra,·
South Dakota Y. Opperman, 428 U. R. 364. 3(i8 (1\:17(5) .
(POWELL,

III
In the present case, the State argues that the warrantless
search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and
its progcny. 8 The police acted properly-indeed commendably-in apprehending respondent and his luggage. They
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant
had proviued a detailed account of respondent 's expected
arrival at the Little Rock Aiport. which account proved to be
accurate in every uetail, incluuing the color of the suitcase i11
which respondellt would be carrying the marihuana. Having
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven
away 111 the taxi. the pohce were Justified in stoppmg the
vehtcle, searching it on the spot, and seizing the suitcase they
suspected contained contraband. See Chamber~; v. Maroney,
1mpra, at 52. At oral argument respondent couceded that th8
stop of the taxi and the seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 30, 44-46.
The only question, therefore. is whether the police, rather
than nnmediately searching the suitcase without a warrant,
should have taken it to the police statio.11 with respondent
and obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of
luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a warrant. In Chadwick we declined an invitation to extend the
Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, notiug that neither
of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of automobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their
'Hr:-;pondent concede;,; that tlw ~llltl'a~e wa;; lm; proJwrty, ;,;ee Brh'f for
:3, and so there i~ no que~Stion of h1:s ::;tanding to challrnge the
search. Ser Simrnous v. United State~, :mo lT :::; :~77, ;{87-:1R8 (1968) .
C:f Rakas ' . Tllinoi~,- l' .S - . - ( 1978)
Rr~pondrnt
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control at the time of the search. Consequently, "there was
not the slightest danger that l the luggage J or its contents
could haw been removed before a valid search warrant could
be obtained.'' 433 1'". S .. at 13. And. as we observed in that
case, luggage. unlike automobiles, is a common repository fot'
one's personal effects. and therefore is associated with an
expectation of privacy largely absent with respect to automobiles. I bid.
The State argues, nevertheless. that the warrantless search
of respondent's ~:;uitcasP was proper. not because thP property
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an
automobile lawfully stopped ami searched on the street. In
effect. the State would have us extend Carroll to allow wart•antless searches of everything found within an automobile,
a~:; well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above. the Supreme
Court of Arkansas found our decision in Chadw~ck virtually
controlling Ill this case. 1' The State contends. however. that
Chadwick does not control because in that case the vehicle had
remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been
placed in its trunk ami that therefore no argument was made
that the automobile search exception was applicable. This
Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constitutionality of a warrantless Sf'arch of luggage taken from an
automobik lawfully stopped. Rather, the decisions to elate
have mvolved searches of some integral part of the automoTh!:' fn<'IH of tlw two case~ at'!:' ~imdar in ~<·vrral entical l'<'::iJWCt~ . In
Chaduotck. n locked. 200-pouiHI footlock!:'r wa~ ,.;earelwcl w1thout a warmnt
after thr pohce, nctm~ with probaiJh• <·au::;!:', had tnk<·n 1t from tlw trunk of
a Jlltrk<'d automobtlc. In thP pre~eut ca~r, rP~ptmdPnt's <·omparattvPiy :;mall,
unlorkPd Hlltlea:;e al,.;o had b!:'rn plated m th!' trunk of an automolnle and
wa~ ll<'ar<'lwd w1t hout a warrant b~· poh<·!:' a<'l mg upon probahl<· rau,.;c. We
do not vww tlw thfferetH't' 11l the ,qze::; of th<' footlorker and :;tutca~c us
matPnal hc·r<'. nor rhd n'~JlOIHknt':- l'atlurP to lock ht~ ,.;mtca~e alter it:,
fundamental rharaclt•r a~ a rrpo:;Jtor~· for Jlt'I'>'Oilal, private !:'tl'eets. Cf
1-Utt', .\ Hec·onstdPraiJOll of the Katz Exp!'CLHilOll or Pnvaey '["(:':;(, 7{ii
,'tid~ L H!:'v 1.1~ , 170 (HJ7"' )
9
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bile.
ee. e. g., South Dakota v. Opperma11, 428 C. R. 364,
366 (1!>76) ( glovP compartment); 'L'exas Y. White, 423 C S.
67. 68 ( 1075) (passenger colllpartnwnt); Cady Y. Dombrowski,
413 1!. S. 433. 437 (una) (trunk); Chambers v. Nfaroney, 39~)
P. S. 42. 44 ( 1970) (concealed compartment under the dashboard); Carroll ,.. [ ~tited States, 267 r. S., at 136 (behind
the upholstering of the seats).
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its bmden of
demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage
properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the
trunk of an automobile may be as mobile as · the vehicle in
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the
search- after the police have seized the object to be searched
and have it securely within their control.'" See 433 ·e. S .. at
13. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the
extent of its mobility is in no way affected by the place from
which it was taken. 1 ' Accordingly, as a general rule there is
no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from
automobiles thall of luggagP taken from other places.'~
7

Thr dillirultie~ i ~ ~r1zing and ~t·eming automohll<'" havp lt>d the Court
to makl' ~pr<'Iai allmrHnr·r~ for tiH'ir ~l'ar<'h. See 11. 14, infm .
1 1 There ma~· lw r·a~P" 111 wlnrh tlw ,:pet'ial !•xigPIIcir~ of th<· ~1tuation
would ju,;tif~ · the warrant]p,;,; ~l'a rel1 of a ,.;uit<'a,;('. ('f. Cady Y. Dombrvte-lkt, 413 P. 8. 4:3:{ (197:{) (polic·e had rm~on to ~ ~~~Jll'<'t automohik• trunk
eo iJtaint•d a weapon) . (;pnerally, howPV!'r. ;:uch PxigPllCil'>J will d('pend
upon thl• probabit' l'Ont!• nt~ of tlw lug;gagP and tiH' "u~prct '~ a1•ep,;,; to tho,.;e
l'Oilt(•IJt"- noi upon whl't hPr t hr· lugg;agr i~ t nken from ail au tomobilt•. In
the prP"t•nt ca::;e the Stat<' Ita~ c·onc·Nied thai thNP Wl'I'P no ~Jlt'Cial t'XIgrn<'It·~- :::lrl' Tr. of Ond Arg., at lti.
::".' 01 do w<· con:O::der 1ht• con~i 1t utwnaltt~· of : > ra rclw~ of luggag(' incident
to the at'l'l'lii of it~ po",;~'""or . Sc•f', e. ff .. United State/! v. Rvbiusun, -114
S. 218 (197:3). The State ha:; not argued that re::;poudPnt 's suitcase·
wa, ~earchPd incident to his arrP,.;t, and it appear" that tlw bag was not
wJthm hi, "immrdiatP control'' at the tim!' of the :;Parr·h .
1
" \Vr haw rreognizPd that pPr,omd prOJH'l't~ · brought I!Ito tlw eountry
may br "<'arrhPd at tlw hord<•r uudcr <'ir·cum~tan<'e>' that would not otht'r10

r.
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Similarly, a suitcase taken from a.n automobile stopped on
the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expectation of privacy than is associated with luggage take11 from
other locations. One is not less inclined to place private,
personal possessions in a suitcase merely because the suitcase
is to be carried in au automobile rather than transported by
other means or tempora.rily checked or storetl. Indeed, the
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for
personal items when one wishes to transport them.u Accordwi~L· ju~tify

a warrantle~:; ,;parch. SPP Cuited State/!\'. Ramsey, 4:H U.S.
fiG6. 61()-617 (1977). Arkan:;a>' dOl'S not a:s,.;prt, how<~vPr. that thP search
t>f rPHpondPut ':s luggage wn:,; a border :-;pan·h. Yiorpovf'r, it Ill!l~· lw that
thP public :safety rf'quires luggagl' be :;parched without a warrant m :somt'
cm·um:-;tauce:;-,;uch a:; whf'n luggag<· i~ about to bf' placed onto an
airplarw. Thi,; prf'8f'nt:s que:stwns under the Fourth Anwndmf'nt wholly
au~(·ut from tlw prf':-;<·nt caHl'.
It i~ hPyond questwn that the police ea:sily could have obtmn(•d a :search
warnmt to :,;earch I'('Spondent'" bag if thf'y had tahn thE' ~uitca:sP to a
lll<lgi:stmtP. Thf'y had prohablr cnu:sP to bPlieve not only that !'(':;pondent
wa~ carrylllg marihuana, but abo that the contraband wa~ containrd in
1I1P suitca,.;p that thPy o<<·izt·•d. ThP StatE' argur,; that undPr tlw circumstanee:,; of this cas<' mconvPniencr to all roncrrnrd would have bern the
only re;;ult of c{pfrrring ~l'arc h of tlw suitcase until a warraut wa:o obtainPd.
Tho~P m l'(~;:;polldrnt'~ po::ittiou who find ~uch mcouvPlllE'l!Ce UJJHccPIJtablP
ma~· avoid it ~imply by con~<'IIting to tlw ~earch .
13 Not all contamers and package~ found by polieP duriug the course of
ft ,;~rch will drservf' tlw full protection of the Fourth Amendment. Thus,
~omr contamrrs (for f'xamplP a kit of burglar toob or a gun cn,;p) by tht>ir
v<·r~· nature cannot support a11~· rf'a>'onablP expeetation of privacy bPcau::;e
th eir routpnt;; ran be inferred from thrir outward apprarancr. Snnilal'ly,
in ::;orm• rase:> the contPllt~ of a package will bP open to '' plam virw,"
tlwreiJy obvwting tlw nePd for a warnmt. Sre Harris, .. United States. :390
l'. S. 23-!, 236 (196~) (per curiam). There Will b<· difticuhtes Ill detPrminlllg \\'hich parcpl:,; taken from an automobile rpquirr a warrant for thrir
srarrh and winch do not. Our dt'ci;;ion in thrs ca:se mean::; ouly that a
warrant genernlly 1~ n•quir<'d before per::;onal luggage run be ~earc hed and
that the Pxtent to whtch th(~ Fourth Arrwndment apphr~ to contamers and
othPr parcel~ dt>pPnd" not nt nil upon whetlwr thPy an~ ~wi zrd from Hll
.m.1 om.l)hik .

7i-J-l9i-OPTKTON

AHKAX.

12

A~

v. SANDERS

ingly. thr reasons for not requiring a warrant for tlw !:warch of
an automobile do not apply to st>arches of JWrsonal luggagr
taken by police from automobiles. vV f' thf'rPforr find 110
justification for thf' extension of C'arroll and its progeny to the
warrantless search of ont>'s personal luggagr men'ly because it
was located in an automobile lawfully stopped by the police.].!
I u sum. we hold that the warrant requirelllent of the Fourth
Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an automobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other
locations. Thus. insofar as thP police are entitled to search
such luggage without a wanant, their actions must be justified
by tht• State·~ aq~;tnneut that , undt•r Chambet.~
t' . S. -l:! (l!:J/0) , if tht• j)OliC!' Wt'l'!' Plltttlf•d to ~PIZl' t}l!'
,;liJI<·a~e, tht•n tlwy WPI't' t•ntltlt•d to ,;parch it. lu Chambl!rs. the Court
upheld tlw wanantl!'~,; ~Pa rch of an antomobilr ~topprd on tlw highwa.' ·
b~ · polt ct• who lwliev!'d that tt >' tH·cnpant8 had rol,f:wd a ga,;ohtH· ~tatton
:1 ,.;hort time bE' fore . Tlw Court recogntzrd that '· [a Irgnabl~ ·. lJC'rau~e of
the prefrn'nce for a mngt:>tntlP·~ judgnwnt. only the immobilizatwn of thP
t·:t r ~ho uld lw permitted until a ~ ear c h warrant i~ ohtaitwd .... " !d .. at
.)1 Xotl('tht-lr~~. the Court ruled that a warrant!<·~~ ,.;<·arch wa.; p :o' rnli ~
, JIJ!e . conchtding that thrn· wa ~ no eon,;titutwnal ditl'Pn•nee U(•tw('Pll the
illt ru ~10 11 of ,;p tJ~mg nnd holdmg tlw automouile unttl a wnrmnt could ul"
ubt: tuted, on th<· oJH' hand, and ~rarchin!!: th<· vPhirlt• without 11 wanaut,
011 the ol het
'V<· vte\\, howl'VPr, tlw ~P:z ure of a s tntcH ~l· a;; qutle differP!It from the
.H<'tzu rt• of 1\11 automobtlP. Itt ('hamb ers. tf IIH' Comt had r('(fltll'Pd
1--Pizun• and holding of t hP vehidr, it would hav!' impo~Pd a cun;:;tttutionnl
rPq uiremt•nt upon peltcl' dc•pa rtnwnt,; of all ~jzp,.. around tltt• country to
have a"atiahlP the peoph• and equipment tWCP~sar~· to lran,;port mtpounded
automohil<·~ to ~ Otlll' central Juration until warrallt~ could br ,.:pcun•d.
\lon•o · Pr, once srized automobil(•" wl't'r tak<•u from I he highway tlw policl'
would hr rP~pon~iblP for providing ,.:onw appropriatP locatiou whl•re the~ ·
could br hpt, with dtH' rE'gard to !lw ,.;afrty of the vehidl'::i aud tht•tr
<•o Jtt< · nt ~. uuttl <I magi;;trate rulNI on lhl· upplicatwn for a warrant. Sueh
·t eon"tt t u tiona! rPqttm•mput t herl'forp would have Hnp ~sed ~t·vere, t•\·en
impo>'~tbiP, bun! <'n~ 011 mau.'· poht·(·' departmt•nt.-<. St>P :'\ote, Warraullt•,..,.. ::::<•arclw" and :::lt•Jzure" of Automobile;:;, l:{i HHJ'\' . L. B~·v. ~~5, ~-H
.-.-l~ (1H74). ~o eomparablt· burd <· n~ ar<' likt·ly to exi,;t with n',.;pt·el lo
tlt;• ~l' IZIII'(! of prr~otlai lll~!!<lg!' .
"\\'pan· uot

\' . J]QI'OI/ <'lj, ;~99

Jll'r~uad!'d

i7-I·Hl7- ( ll'l:\ ll )\'

un<l<-r some exceptio11 to tl11• warrallt requirement othPl' than
that applicable to automobiles stopp<>d 011 tlw higiJway.
\YherP-as in tlw prPsen t ca~<>-the police. without <•ndangcring themselves or risking los~ of tlw Pvidencf'. lawful ly have
detained one su~:;pectecl of erimi11al activity and secured his
suitcasP, they should delay thr search tlwreof until aftPr JUdi•al a J Jroval has been obtained. In this way. constitutio11aJ
..,-~=;;;;..-;-n-~r,:.ii!;~'·I~J.!::ts~o~f.sUSJWCts · prior .i udicial revi<•w of searciH•s will bP
f u Jly -+¥'~·~r.
The judgment of the Arkan~as Rupn·nw Court i~
Affirmed.
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Memorandum
To:

Justice Powell

Re:

Arkansas v. Sanders
As you can see, Justice Stevens is not entirely

pleased with our opinion.

Justice Marshall asked, through

his clerk, that you be told that he is very pleased with
the opinion, that he disagrees with Justice Stevens, and
that he would urge you not to make any changes along the
lines suggested.

He also said he would be happy to discuss

the matter with you.
Our reaction here in chambers is similar to that of
Justice Marshall.

If the police know the contraband

is in

the automobile, but are not sure where, they can search the
entire car (save the luggage) and then obtain a warrant for
the search of the luggage, having determined by process of
elimination where the contraband must be.

Moreover, to draw

attention to this situation by distinguishing it will not
avoid deciding the issue, but rather will risk deciding it
sub silentio in a case in which it was not presented.

Finally,

the more we narrow the holding of this case, the less guidance
we will afford trial courts and police--which was the reason;
we took the case in the first place.
Having said all this, I recommend that we wait and
see what your Brethren have to say.

If necessary to keep

a Court, we should of course make the change Justice Stevens
suggests.
David

,jnprmu Qfllltrl d

tlrt ~b ,jhttts

~Mfrin:ghm. ~. QJ. 2.Llhfl!~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 4, 1979

Re:

No. 77-1497, Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Lewis,
Although I agree with your fine opinion and expect
to join it, I would be happier if you could see your way
clear to deleting the last sentence on page 7 and the last
sentence of the run-over paragraph at the top of page 9.
The elimination of these sentences is not a condition
of my joining your opinion. But, if you decide to keep
them, perhaps you would be willing to somewhat modify their
language.
In the last sentence on page 7, could "substantially
dilutes" be changed to something like "may sometimes dilute"?
And could the language in the sentence toward the top of page
9 be changed to read "luggage is a common repository for one's
personal effects, and therefore, is inevitably associated with
the expectation of privacy."?
I have just read a copy of John's letter to you, and
would have no objection to narrowing the opinion along the
lines he suggests, if you think it necessary or appropriate
to do so.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~JtVUlttt

QfMtrf o-f tfrt 'Jtnittb- ~bdtg

,ra,glfin:ghttt. ~. <lf.

21l.;r~~

C HAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

April 4, 1979

RE:

No. 77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Lewis:
At Conference I believe I suggested that there may
be a distinction between a case in which the police have
probable cause to believe that a particular piece of
luggage contains contraband and another case in which
they merely have probable cause to believe that contraband
is located somewhere in an automobile, possibly within
a piece of luggage in the car.
I also suggested that we
should avoid deciding the latter case because it comes a
good deal closer to the automobile exception.

1

As your opinion is presently written, I believe it
decides both cases and therefore is somewhat broader
than necessarl{JLn its holding.
If the Court is disposed
to accept your proposed disposition, I will write a short
statement concurring in the result.
On the other hand,
if you are amenable to narrowing the holding, relatively
minor changes would pick up my vote.
Respectfully,

fA
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

jln;rrtmt Qfllurlllf firt ~b Jtattg
--a,g~ ~. <If. 2ll,?~~
CHAMBERS OF

JusTicE

wM .

Apri 1 5, 1979

J . BRENNAN, JR.

RE:

No. 77-1497 Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Lewis:
I think this is a very fine and helpful opinion
and I am happy to join. I hope you will not adopt
John's suggestion to narrow it. I do think, however,
that Potter's sugqestions are well taken.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 77-1497
State of Arkansas, Petitioner,

v.
.
d
I.JOnme James San ers.

I

On Writ of Certiorari to the
Supreme court of Arkansas .

[April -, 1979]
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents the question whether, in the absence of
exigent circumstances, police are required to obtain a warrant
before searching luggage taken from an automobile properly
stopped and searched for contraband. We took this case by
writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Arkansas to resolve
some apparent misunderstanding as to the application of our
decision in United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977), to
warrantless searches of luggage seized from automobiles. 1
I
On April 23, 1976, Officer David Isom of the Little Rock,
Ark., Police Department received word from an informant
that at 4:35 that afternoon respondent would arrive aboard an
American Airlines flight at gate number one of the Municipal
Airport of Little Rock, Ark. According to the informant,
respondent would be carrying a green suitcase containing
rnarihuana. Both Isom and the informant knew respondent
well, as in January of 1976 the informant had given the Little
Rock Police Department information that had led to respondent's arrest and conviction for possession of marihuana.
Com p:ne Umted States v. Finnegan, 568 F . 2d 637, 641-642 (CA9
1977), with United States v. Stevie, 582 F . 2d 1175, 1178- 1179 (CAS 1978)
(en bane).
1
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Acting on the tip, Officer Isom and two other police officers
placed the airport under surveillance. As the informant had
predicted, respondent duly arrived at gate one. The police
watched as respoudent deposited some hand luggage in a
waiting taxicab, returned to the baggage claim area, and met
a man whom police subsequently identified as David Rambo.
While Rambo waited, respondent retrieved from the airline
baggage service a green suitcase matching that described by
the informant. Respondent gave this suitcase to his companion and went outside, where he entered the taxi into which
he had put his luggage. .R ambo waited a short while in the
airport and then joined respondent in the taxi, after placing
the green suitcase in the trunk of the vehicle.
When respondent's taxi drove away carrying respondent,
Rambo. and the suitcase, Officer Isom and one of his fellow
officers gave pursuit and, with the help of a patrol car, stopped
the vehicle several blocks from the airport. At the request of
the police, the taxi driver opened the trunk of his vehicle,
where the officers found the green suitcase. Without asking
the permission of either respondent or Rambo, the police
opened the unlocked suitcase and discovered what proved to
be 9.3 pounds of marihuana packaged in 10 plastic bags.
On October 14, 1976, respondent and Rambo were charged
with possession of marihuana with intent to deliver in violation of Ark. Stat. Ann. ~ 82-2617 (1976).~ Before trial,
respondent moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the
suitcase. contending that the search violated his rights under
the Fourth anti Fourteenth Amendments. The trial court
held a hearing on January 31, 1977, and denied the suppression motion without explanation. After respondent's convic2
Jn addition to tlw marihuana found in 1hc :suitca:sP, police officers
fou!l(l one ounce of heroin hidden iu their patrol car after tran:sporting
!{ambo to police headquar1rr~ . Accordingly, Hambo abo wa:,; charged
w1th poH:;E'8:siou of heroin with in1rn1 to deliver. Immediately before trial
on both counts, t.lw court severed the heroiu pos:;eRsioil rount for later
t rial.
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tion by a jUI'y on February 3, 1977, he was sentenced to 10
years in prison and was fined $15,000.
On appeal the Supreme Court of Arkansas reversed respondent's conviction, ruling that the trial court should have
suppressed the marihuana because it was obtained through
an unlawful search of the suitcase. 262 Ark. 595, 559 S.
2d 704 (1977). Relying upon United States v. Chadwick,
supra, and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443 (1971),
the court concluded that a warrantless search generally must
be supported by "probabl~:> cause coupled with exigent circumstances." 262 Ark., at 599, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706. In the
present case, the court found there was ample probable cause
for the police officers' belief that contraband was contained in
the suitcase they searched. The court found to be wholly
lacking, however, any exigent circumstance justifying the
officers' failure to secUI'e a warrant for the search of the luggage. With the police in control of the automobile and its
occupants, there was no danger that the suitcase and its
contents would be rendered unavailable to clue legal process.
The court concluded, therefore, that there was "nothing in this
set of circumstances that would lend credence to an assertion
of impracticality in obtaining a search warrant.'' 262 Ark.,
a.t 600, 559 S. W. 2d, at 706. 3
II

"T·

Although the general principles applicable to claims of
:Fourth Amendment violations are well settled, litigation over
requests for suppression of highly relevant evidence continues
to occupy much of the attention of courts at all levels of the
sta.te and federal judiciary. Courts and law enforcement
3 " With the suitcase safely immobilized, it was unreasonable to undertnke the additional and greater intrusion of a search without a warrant."
262 Ark. 595, 601, 559 S. W. 2d 704, 707. The court also rejected the
State's contention that luggnge is entitled to a le::;ser protection against
warrantless searches than are other private areas, such as homes. It noted
that suitcases, unlike automvbile::;, cu::;tom:uily ane ilhe lie_posiitorie;:; for _perOOltat effects.
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officials often find it difficult to discern the proper application
these principles to individual cases, because the circumstances
giving rise to suppression requests can vary almost infinitely.
Moreover, an apparently small difference in the factual situation frequently is viewed as a controlling difference in determining Fourth Amendment rights. The present case presents
an example. Only two Terms ago, we held that a locked footlocker could not lawfully be searched without a warrant, even
though it had been loaded into the trunk of an automobile
parked at a curb. U·11ited States y. Chadwick, supra. In
earlier cases, on the other hand, the Court sustained the constitutionality of warrantless searches of automobiles and
their contents under what has become known as the "automobile exception " to the warrant requirement. See, e. g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 ( 1970); Carroll v. United States,
267 U. S. 132 (1925). We thus are presented with the task
of determining whether the warrantless search of respondent's
suitcase falls on the Chadwick or the Chambers/Carroll side
of the Fourth Amendment line. Although in a sense this is
a line-drawing process, it must be guided by established
principles.
We commence with a summary of these principles. The
Fourth Amendment protects the privacy and security of persons in two important ways. First, it guarantees " [ t] he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." In addition, this Court has interpreted the amendment to include the
requirement that normally searches of private property be
performed pursuant to a search warrant issued in compliance
with thP warrant clause. 1 See, e. g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437
4

The warnmt (']au:sr of thr Fourth Amendmrnt provide:> that, "no War-·
shall isstu', but npou probable cau:se, :;upported by Oath or affirmation, and partic\llnrly describing the placr to be :searched and the prr:;ons
or things to be seizrd.'' The Fourth Amendment ha;; bE'en madr fully
applicablr. to the StaN'::> by tho FourtePlJt.h Amendment . S<·e Mapp v.
rant~
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U. S. 385, 390 (1978); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S.
1, 9 (1977); United States v. United States District Court,
407 U. S. 297, 317 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U. S.
347, 357 (1967); Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 33
( 1925). In the ordinary ease, therefore, a search of private
property must be both reasonable and performed pursuant to
a properly issued sea.rch warrant. The mere reasonableness
of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is Hot a substitute for the judicial warrant required
under the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. United
States District Court, supra. As the Court said in Coolidge v.
New Ha·mpshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971),
"ft]he warrant requirement has been a valued part of our
constitutional law for decades, and it has determined the
result in scores and scores of cases in courts all over this
country. It is not an inconvenience to be somehow
'weighed' against the claims of police efficiency. It is, or
should be, an important working part of our machinery of
government, operating as a matter of course to check the
'well-intentioned but mistakenly overzealous executive
officers' who are a part of any system of law enforcement."
The prominent place the warrant requirement is given in our
decisions reflects the "basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation
of powers and divisio11 of functions among the different
branches and levels of government." United States v. United
States District Court, supra, at 317. By requiring that conclusions concerning probable cause and the scope of a search
"be drawn by ·a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
bemg judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive
enterprise of ferreting out crime," Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948), we minimize the risk of unreasonable
Ohio, :367 U.S. 643 (1961) ; Wolf\'. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). In
thi;; opmion we rl'fer to tlw Fourth Amendment as it ~o applirs to the
81 a tP of A rkanl:ia:>.
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assertions of executive authority. See M cDouald v. · United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-456 (1948). 6
Nonetheless, there are some exceptions to the warrant
requirement. These have been established where it was concluded that the public interest required some flexibility iu the
application of the general rule that a valid warrant is a
prerequisite for a search. See [!nited States v. ·MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 ( 1976). Thus, a few "jealously and
carefully drawn"(; exceptions provide for those cases where the
societal costs of obtaining a warrant. such as danger to law
officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence. outweigh
the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral ma.gistate. See
United States v. Urnited States District Court, SU'fYta, at 318.
But because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of
the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search
may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been
carefully delineated and "the burden is on those seeking the
exemption to show the need for it." United States v. Jeffers,
342 U. S. 48, 51 (1951). See Chime{ v. California, 3~)5 U. S.
752. 7()2 (1969); Katz v. United States, supra., at 357. Moreover, we have limited the reach of each exception to tha.t which
is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society.
See Mincey v. ArizO'na, supra, at 393; United States v. Chadwick, supra, at 15 (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra,
at 45.5.
Thr nred for a carefully drawn, limited warrant for searches of private
the product in large pnrt of the colonist~' re:;entment of the
writs of a:;sisbmce to whieh tlwy were subjected by the Engli;;h. See
Unitl'd States v. Chadwick. 433 U. S. 1, 8 (1977); ,l. Landynski. Search
and SrizurP and the SupremP Court, 19 (1966) ; N. La~son, Thr History
and Development of thr Fourth Amendmrnt to the Unitrd StntrH Con~titution .'i1-78 (19:~7). :Mr . .Tu~ticr Frankfurter went ><o far a~ to ,;uggest that nbuse~ of the writ~ of a":sistance were ":;o dreply felt b~· the
ColoniPI" n~ 1o hr onr of the potPnt cnu~Ps of thr Hevolution ." United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, (i9 (1950) (di;;:;pnting opinion) .
H.Jones v. United :StateiS, 357 U. S, 493, 499 (1958).
5

premi~cs wa~

77-1497-0PINION
ARKANSAS v. SANDERS

7

One of the circumstances in which the Constitution does not
require a search warrant is when the police stop an automobile
on the street or highway because they have probable cause to
believe it contains contraband or evidence of a crime. See
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U. S. 543. 561-562
(1976); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U. S. 891, 896 (1975);
Texas v. White, 423 U. S. 67. 68 (1975). As the Court said
m Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 153 (1925),
"the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the Fourth Amendme11t has been construed,
practically since the beginniHg of the Government, as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a
store. dwelling house or other structure in respect of
which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained,
and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile,
for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure
a, warra,n t. . . ." 7
There nre essentially two reasons for the distinction between
automobiles and other private property. First, as the Court
repeatedly has recognized, the inherent mobility of automobiles often makes it impracticable to obtain a warrant. See,
e. g., United States v. C:hadtvick, supra, at 12; Chambers v.
Maroney, 399 U. S.. 49-50 (1970); Carroll v. United States,
8Upra. In addition. the configuration. use. and regulation of
automobiles often may dilute the reasonable expect.a tion of\
privacy that exists with respect to difl'erently situated property. See Rakas v. Illinois,- U.S.-,- (1978) (POWI<JLL,
The willingness of courts to excu~e the absence of a warrant where
spontan<•ou;;; searches are requirPd of a vehicle on the road has led to what
i~ rallrcl thl' "automobile exc:eption" to the warrant ret~uirement, although
the rxr<'ption clot•s not invariabl~· apply whenever automobiles are searched.
SP<', 1'. (/ .. Coolidge Y. Neu• Hampshire, 40:3 U. S. 44:{, 461-462 (1971)
(" Tiw word 'automobile' is not a tali:sman in who:,;p prPsence the Fourth
Anw11dment fad!'S away and di~nppru.r:,;. " ). See generally Moylan, The
Automobile Exception: What it i~ and What it iH not-A Hationale in
Searrh of a Clearer Lnl>el, 27 i\lcrcPr L. Hev. 987 (1976) .
7

77-1497-0PINION
ARKANSAS v. SANDERS

8

J. , concurring); United States v. Chadwick, supra; South
Dakoln , .. Opperman, 428 1'. R. 364. 368 (1976); Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U. R. 583. 5HO (1974) (plurality opinion); Cady v.
Dombrowski, 413 U. S. 441-442 ( H)73); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 279 (PowELL, J., concurring) .

III
In the present case, the State argues that the wa.rrantless
· search of respondent's suitcase was proper under Carroll and
its progeny. 8 The police acted properly-indeed commendably- in apprehending respondent ami his luggage. They
had ample probable cause to believe that respondent's green
suitcase contained marihuana. A previously reliable informant
had provided a detailed account of respondent's expected
arrival at the Little Rock Aiport. which account proved to be
accurate in every detaiL including the color of the suitcase in
which respondent would be carrying the marihuana. Having
probable cause to believe that contraband was being driven
away in the taxi. the police were justified in stopping the
vehicle, searching it on the spot. and seizing the suitcase they
suspected contained contraband. See Chambers v. Jl1aroney,
supra, at 52. At oral argumeu t respondent conceded that the
stop of the taxi aud the seizure of the suitcase were constitutionally unobjectionable. See Tr. of Oral Arg., at 30. 44- 46.
The only question , therefore, is whether the police, rather
than immediately searching the suitcase without a warrant,
should have taken it to the police station with respondent
and obtained a warrant for the search. A lawful search of
luggage generally may be performed only pursuant to a warrant. In Chadwick we declined an invitation to extend the
Carroll exception to all searches of luggage, noting that neither
~ He~ pondrnt

eoncedes that the suitcase wa:; his property, see Brief for
:3, and ,;o there i~ no question of hi::s standing to challenge the
:;carch . Sre Sirnmo'll s v. United States, 390 U. S. 377, 387-3&"1 (196 8) ~
( ('f Rakas v. lllinois, ·- U. S - •. (1978 ) .
[~e~ pondcnt

'.
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of the two policies supporting warrantless searches of automobiles applies to luggage. Here, as in Chadwick, the officers
had seized the luggage and had it exclusively within their
control at the time of the search. Consequently. "there wa.s
not the slightest danger that [the luggage] or its contents
could have been removed before a valid search warrant could
be obtained." 433 U. S., at 13. And, as we observed in that
case, luggage is a common repository for one's personal effects,
and therefore is inevitably associated with the expectation of
privacy. Ibid.
The State argues, nevertheless. that the warrantless search
of respondent's suitcase was proper, not because the property
searched was luggage, but rather because it was taken from an
automobile lawfully stopped and searched on the street. In
effect, the State would have us extend Carroll to allow warrantless searches of everything found within an automobile,
as well as of the vehicle itself. As noted above, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas foulld our decision in Chadwick virtually
controlling in this case. 0 The State contends, however. that
Chadwick does not control because in that case the vehicle had
remained parked at the curb where the footlocker had been
placed in its trunk and that therefore no argument was made
that the automobile search exception was applicable. This
Court has not had occasion previously to rule on the constituu The facts of the two cases are similar in several critical respects. In
Chadwick, a locked, 200-pound footlocker was searched without n, warrant
after the police, acting with probablr cau:se, had taken it from the trunk of
a parked automobile. In the presPnt ca~e, re::;pondent 's comparatively :small,
unlocked ~uitcnsp abo had been placPcl in the trunk of an automobile and
W<)~ searched without a warrnnt by policr acting upon probable cause. We
do not view tht> difference in the ,;ize,.; of the footlocker and suitcase as
material here; nor did respondent's failure to lock his suitcase alter its
fundamental charaeter as a repository for personal, private effect::;. Cf.
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 7(}
Mieh. L. Rev . 154, 170 (1977) .
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tiouality of a warrantless search of luggage taken from an
automobile lawfully stopped. Rather, the decisions to date
have involved searches of some integral part of the automobile. See. e. y., South Dakota Y. Oppennan, 428 U. S. 364,
366 ( 1976) (glove compartment); Texas v. White, 423 U. S.
67, 68 (1975) (passenger compartment); Cady v. Dombrowski,
413 U.S. 433, 437 ( 1973) (trunk); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U. S. 42, 44 (1970) (concealed compartment under the dash~
board); Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S., at 136 (behind
the upholstering of the seats).
We conclude that the State has failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating the need for warrantless searches of luggage
properly taken from automobiles. A closed suitcase in the
truuk of an automobile may be as mobile as the vehicle in
which it rides. But as we noted in Chadwick, the exigency of
mobility must be assessed at the point immediately before the
search-after the police have seized the object to be searched
and have it securely within their COJJtrol. 1" See 433 U. R., at
13. Once police have seized a suitcase, as they did here, the
extent of its mobility is iu no way affected by the place from
which it was taken. 11 Accon.lingly. as a general rule there is
10 The difficulti(•s i~ :;eizing and seeuring :111tomobilcs have led the Court
to make special allowance:; fur their search. Seen. 14, infm.
11
There may be caHrs in which the special exigrncies of the situation
would ju~tify the warrantle:;s search of a suitcase. Cf. Cady v. Dombrowskt, 41;{ U.S. 43a (1973) (police had reason to suspect automobile trunk
rontainC'd a weapon). Generally, however, such rxigencirs will depend
upon the probable contents of the luggage and the su:;pect's acre::;;; to tho:;c
contrnt~-not upon whether thr luggage is taken from an automobi l<'. In
thP prr,:<?nt ca::;c the State has corH'!'cl<?d that there wrrP no special exigent'JE'~ . SrP Tr. of Oral Arg., at Hi.
1\'or uo we cou~idPr tlw cou~titutionality of ,:;earches of luggagr incident
to thP arre:;t of it:; po~ses;;or. St'c, e. g., United States v. Robiuson, 414
U. S. 218 (197:3) . The State ha;; not argued tha.t respondent's suitcase
wa:; searchrd incident to his arre~t. and 1t appear:; that the bag was not
w1thm h1s "immed.wte ront.rol" at the time of the ~carch ,
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no greater need for warrantless searches of luggage taken from
automobiles than of luggage taken from other places. 12
Similarly, a suitcase taken from an automobile stopped on
the highway is not necessarily attended by any lesser expecta·
tion of privacy than is associated with luggage taken from
other locations. One is not less inclined to place private,
personal possessions iu a suitcase merely because the suitcase
is to be carried in an automobile rather than transported by
other means or temporarily checked or stored. Indeed, the
very purpose of a suitcase is to serve as a repository for
personal items when one wishes to transport them. ~ Accord·
1

that per~oual proJwrt~· brought into tht' country
at the bordPr undpr circumstanc~ that would not otherwi~e ju~tify a warrantlPs~ i>earch . SeP United States v. Ra·msey, 431 U. S.
606, tl16-617 (1977). ArkansaH does not a;:;sert, how<,ver, that tlw search
of respondent's luggagP was a border ~earch. MoreovPr, ii may bP that
thP puulic safet~· requires luggage be searched without a warrant in some
cirrurnstaucPs-such as when lnggag<' is about to be placed onto an
airplane . This presrnts questions under the Fourth Amendment wholly
HU:>f•nt from the prPsent ca~e .
11 i;:; beyond question that the police Pasily could have obtained a search
warrant to ~Parch rrspondpnt 's bag if th<>y had takrn thr suitcase to a
magi"tratP. They had probablr cause to believe not only that rrspondent
was carryiug marihuana , but also that thr contraband was contained in
thP suitca~r that they ~eized. The Statr argues that under the circuml:!tnnre~ of thi~ ca~c iuconvrniencP to all concerned would have been the
only r€'sult of drff'rring srarch of tlw suitcasr until a warrant was obtained.
Tho::;C' in respondent 's position who find such inconvenience unacceptable
may aYoid it simply by consmtiug to the search.
13
Not all containers and packages found b:v police during the course of
a senrch will deservf' thr full prot:<•ction of the .Fourth Amendment. Thus,
l:!OmP contamf'rs (for €'xampl€' a kit of burglar tool~ or a gun ca::;r) by thrir
1·er:v nature cannot ;,;upport any rPa;,;onable exprctation of privacy brcause
th ~ ir coutPnts can be inferred from tlH'ir outward appearance. Similarly,
in some ca~r~ the coutpnt:; of a packagr will be open to '"plain view,"
thrrrby obviating the nePd for a warrant. Sre Harris 1·. United States, 390
U. S. ~34, 2:~6 (1968) (per cwiarn) . There will be dit!icultie,.; in determining which parcel:s taken from au automobile requin• a warrant for their
~ea rrh and which do not. Our dcr1.~ion iu 1his ras€' mean~ only iha t a
12

WP bavP

may be

recogniz~·d

~earched
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ingly, the r·easons for not requiring a warrant for the search of
an automobile do not apply to searches of personal luggage
taken by police from automobiles. We thereforf' find no
justification for the extension of Cat-roll and its progeny to the
warrantless search of one's personal luggage merely because it
was located in au automobile lawfully stoppe<l by the police.H
In sum, we hold that the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment applies to personal luggage taken from an autowarrant generally is rrquirrd brfor<• per;;orwl luggag<' can lw ~rarched :md
that the rxteut to wh1rh the Fourth Amendment applie~ to containers and
ollwr parcPIH clepc·ndH not at all upon whether thry arr ,.;eizPd from an
automobil<'.
1 1 WP a r<' not p<'rsua<.!Pd b~· the State'::; argument that, undrr Chambers
v. Maroney, ;399 0. S. 42 (1970), if the polirr wrrr rntJtled to se1ze the
suitca,;c•, thrn they wPrc entitled to srarch 1t. In Chambers. the Court
uphPid the• warrautlr~" Hearrh of an automobile stoptwd on thr highway
by police who helievPd that it:-; occupants had robbed a gasoliue statiOn
a :short tim<' brfor<'. The Comt recogmzed that "La lrguably, bPcau~e of
the preference for a magis! rate's judgmmt, only tht' immobiliznt iou of the
car should br permitted until n s<'arch warrant is obtained .. .. " !d., at
51. NonPtllf'lrss, the Court rulrd that a warrantle,;,; search wa,.; penni<'sJble, concluding that thrrc· wa~ no constitutional diffrrencr brtween the
int ru$ion of seizing and holdiug thP automobile until a warrant could be
obtained, on t hr one hand, and sParchiug 11H' vehicln Without a warrant,
on tht> other.
Wr view, however, thr :se1zure of a suitcase as quitr dd'ferent from the
Heizure of au automobile. Iu Chambers, if thr Court had requirrd
::wizure and holding of tbr vehicle, it would havr imposed a constitutional
rrquirement upon pclice departments of all ~Size::; around th<' country to
have a-·ailabl{· the pc·oplr nnd equipment nece::>sary to tran::;port impounded
automobile~> to ::;omP central loc·ation until warrantH could br secured.
:Yloreo· Pr, oncr seized automobile,.; wrre taken from th<' highway the police
would U<' respon~iblr for providing ;:;ome approprwtr location where they
could br krpt, with due regard to the safrty of the veh!clrs and their
eoutruts, until n magi:strate ruil•d on thP application for a warrant. Such
a. cout:titutional requirrnwnt thrrrforr would hav<• imposed :;rverr, even
impo~s ! ble. burdrn,; on many pohce department;;. &>e Not~·, WarrantIt•:;,; ~('<II'Ches and SPIZ\II'Ct-1 or Automobiles, 8i Harv. L. Hrv. R35, 841R4:l ( 1974). No comparable burden;:; arr likely to rxb1 with rE'spect to
the seizurr of pert<onal IHggu!!;t'

....
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mobile to the same degree it applies to such luggage in other
locations. Thus, insofar as the police are entitled to search
such luggage without a warrant, their actions must be justified
under some exception to the warrant requirement other than
that applicable to automobiles stopped 011 the highway.
Where-as in the present case-the police, without endangering themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have
detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his
suitcase, they should delay the search thereof until after judicial approval has been obtained. In this way. constitutional
rights of suspects to prior judicial review of searches will be
fully protected.
The judgment of the Arkansas Supreme Court is
Affirmed.
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suggest, although I quite understand that it could be viewed
ai~~ an acceptable alternative .
·
,·
~ 't<

('f'~

.....~

We took this case because of the apparent
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the contraband is in the automobile, but are not sure where,
under our cases they ~ay search the entire car except for
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If the contraband is not found in this
search, the oolice certainly will have probable cause to
obtain a warrant for search of the luggage .
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Memorandum
Justice Powell
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Ark. v. Sanders

After reading Justice Bl~ckmun's dissent,
I have two responses. First, the problems he
finds with our opinion, see pp. 6-8, are by in
large problems--not produced by our opinion or
by Chadwick--but rather are problems generally
with Fourth Amendment law. Thus, the scope of
a search incident to an arrest is a question
that arises in every context--not just when
automobiles are stopped. Similarly, which
containers carry with them a reasonable expectatiDn
of privacy is a question that has nothing to
do with automobiles. Indeed, we point out as
much in note 13 of our opinion. Thus, what kJ~stice
Blackmun is really suggesting is not that w~·Lt~ dy
up the law surr~~ ding the automobile except~on,
but rather tha ~ lwe use the automobile exception
to oversimplify other problems arising under the
Fourth Amendment.
Second, and more generally, as long as we
continue to enforce the warrant clause of the
Fourth Amendment , there will be close cases and
cases in which evidence is suppressed that police
plainly had probable cause to obtain. This is
no reason, however, to seize upon fascile, brightline rules. If the police remain in doubt in
close cases, let them get a warrant unnecessarily.
By limiting the rule in this case to containers
that police easily can transport to the station,
we minimize the imposition upon police.
Having said all of this, I have doubts about
whether we need to respond to J~ice Blackmun.
The responses I suggest may be obvious, and what
Justice Blackmun has to say does not differ that
much from his dissent in
Chadwick.
David
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and a 200 pound, double-locked footlocker was seized, as the
locker was being loaded into the open trunk of a stationary
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not to argue in this Court that the automobile exception ap-
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at 11.

Here, in contrast, the Little Rock

police stopped a taxicab on a busy highway at the height of
They had probable cause to believe

late afternoon traffic.
the

taxi

contained

contraband

They

narcotics.

opened

the

trunk, and briefly examined the contents of a small unlocked
suitcase inside.
out

these

trunk

and

The State has vigorously contended through-

proceedings

that

unlocked

the

the

warrantless

suitcase

search

of

the

constitutionally

was

permissible under the automobile exception.
I

fully agree.

illegally transported

If

"contraband goods concealed and

in an automobile or other vehicle may

be searched for without a warrant," Carroll v. United States,
267

u.s.

132,

153

(1925),

then,

in

my

view,

luggage

and

similar containers found in an automobile may be searched for
contraband
automobile
of

privacy

without

a

transporting
in a

warrant.
it,

sui tease
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found

luggage,
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the

And

the expectation

in the car
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locked glove compartment or trunk.
To be sure, as I acknowledged in Chadwick, 433

u.s.,

at 19, impounding the luggage without searching it would be a
less
But

intrusive
this

intrusion
search,
Maroney,
persons
Robinson,

alternative
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seizure
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arrest.
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to impose such a distinction here.
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(1970),

custodial
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"greater"

to

51-52

it

of

Chambers

v.

with

respect

to

United

States

v.

or

And

I

see no reason

Given the significant

Court stated in Chambers, 399 u.s., at 51-52:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's
judgment, only the immobilization of the car should be
permitted
until
a
search
warrant
is
obtained;
arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible
until the magistrate authorizes the 'greater.' But
which
is
the
'greater'
and
which
the
'lesser'
intrusion is itself a debatable question and the
answer may depend on a variety of circumstances. For
constitutional purposes, we see no difference between
on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate
and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search
without a warrant."
~/The

a

No. 77-1497

- 5 encroachment on privacy interests entailed by a seizure of
personal
may

property,

well

additional

be

the

addi tiona!

regarded

protection

likely be minimal.

as

intrusion

incidental.

provided

by

a

of

a

search

Moreover,

search

the

warrant will

Since the police, by hypothesis, have

probable cause to seize the property, we can assume that a
warrant will be routinely forthcoming
majority of cases.

in the overwhelming

Finally, the carving out of a special

warrant requirement for one type of personal property, but
not for others, will impose untoward costs on the criminal
justice systems of this country in terms of

added delay

and uncertainty.
The impractical nature of the Court's line-drawing is
brought into focus if one places himself in the position
of
has

the policeman confronting an automobile that properly
been

occupants,

stopped.

In

approaching

the

vehicle

and

its

the officer must divide the world of personal
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arrest the occupants, then under Chime! v. California, 395
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search

control,
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mobile itself, then under Carroll and Chambers the entire
interior area of the automobile may be searched, with or
without

a

warrant.

But

under

Chadwick

and

the

present

case, if any suitcase-like object is found in the car outside the immediate control area of the occupants, it cannot be searched,

in the absence of exigent circumstances,

without a warrant.
The

inherent
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of

these

"principles,"

in

terms of the policies underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments,
cerned,

is

and

the confusion to be created for

readily

luggage-container-rack
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to
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a
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the

arresting officer

constitutionally able

to open this on the spot, on the theory that it is like
the car's trunk, or must he remove it and take it to the
station for
200

pound

a warrant, on the theory that it is like the
footlocker

Or

in Chadwick?

suppose

there

is

probable cause to arrest persons seated in the front seat
of the automobile, and a suitcase rests on the back seat.
Is

that

such

suitcase

that

suppose

the

the

within

the

area

Chadwick-Sanders

arresting officer

of
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opens

immediate
do

not

the car's

control,

apply?

Or

trunk

and

finds that it contains an array of containers -- an orange
crate,

an

at tache

case,

a duffelbag 1

backpack, a totebag, and a paper bag.

a cardboard box,

a

Which of these may

be searched immediately, and which are so "personal" that
they must be impounded for future search only pursuant to
a

warrant?
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and

The problems of distinguishing between "lug"some

integral part of

the

automobile 1"
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not;

and

between "personal luggage" and other "containers and packages" such as those most curiously described, ante, at 11
n. 13, will be legion.

The lines that will be drawn will

not make much sense in terms of the policies of the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
ities for

And the heightened possibil-

error will mean that many convictions will be

overturned,

highly

relevant

evidence

again

will

be

ex-

eluded, and guilty persons will be set free in return for
little

apparent

gain

in

precise

and

clearly

understood

constitutional analysis.
In my view,

it would be better to adopt a clear-cut

rule to the effect that a warrant should not be required
to

seize

and

search

any

personal

property

found

in

an

automobile that may in turn be seized and searched without
a warrant pursuant to Carroll and Chambers.
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MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN, with whom MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST joins, dissenting.
This case illustrates the difficulties and confusion that
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U. S. 1 (1977) , has spawned
and will continue to spawn. For reasons I stated in dissent
in Chadwick, id., at 18-22 and 24, I continue to feel that that
decision was wrong.
The Court today, in what may be a somewhat gratuitous
approach (see MR. JusTICE STEVENS' concurrence, ante), goes
farther down the Chadwick road, undermines the automobile
exception, and, while purporting to clarify the confusion occasioned by Chadwick, creates, in my view, only greater difficulties for law enforcement officers, for prosecutors, for those
suspected of criminal activity, and, of course, for the courts
themselves. Still hanging in limbo, and probably soon to be
litigated are the briefcase, the wallet, the package, the paper
bag, and every other kind of container.
I am unpersuaded by the Court's casual sta.tement, ante, at
9 n. 9, that Chadwick and this case are factually similar "in
sever~l critical respects." Even accepting Chadwick as good
law, which I do not, this, for me, is a different case. In
Chadwick, the defendants were arrested, and a 200-pound,·
double-locked footlocker was seized, as the locker was being
loaded into the open trunk of a stationary automobile. The
relationship between the footlocker and the vehicle was sufficiently attenuated that the Government chose not to argue in
this Court that the automobile exception applied. 433 U. S.,.

•·'
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at 11. Here, in contrast, the Little Rock police stopped a
taxicab on a busy highway at the height of late afternoon
traffic. They had probable cause to believe the ta.xi contained
contraband narcotics. They opened the trunk, and briefly
examined the contents of a small unlocked suitcase inside.
The State has vigorously contended throughout these proceed~
ings that the warrantless search of the trunk a.nd the unlocked
suitcase was constitutionally permissible under the automobile·
exception.
I fully agree. If "contraband goods concealed and illegally
transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched
for without a warrant," Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S.
132, 153 (1925), then, in my view, luggage and similar containers found in an automobile may be searched for contra~
band without a warrant. The luggage, like the automobile
transporting it, is mobile. And the expectation of privacy in
a suitcase found in the car is probably not significantly greater
than the expectation of privacy in a locked glove compartment
or trunk.
To be sure, as I acknowledged in Chadwick, 433 U.S., at 19,
impounding the luggage without searching it would be a less
intrusive altern~ttive than searching it on the spot. But this
Court has not distinguished between the "lesser" intrusion of
a seizure and the "greater" intrusion of a search, either with
respect to automobiles, Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U. S. 42,
51-52 ( 1970), or with respect to persons subject to custodial
arrest. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218,235 (1973) .*
*The Court stated in Chambers, 399 U. S., at 51-52:
"Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only the
immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant is
obtained; arguably, only the 'lesser' intrusion is permissible until the magistrate authorizes the 'greater.' But which is the 'greater' and which the
'lesser' intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may depend
on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying
QUt an immediate search without a warrant."

77-1497-DISSENT
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And I see no reason to impose such a distinction here. Given
the significant encroachment on privacy interests entailed by
a, seizure of personal property, the additional intrusion of a
search may well be regarded as incidental. Moreover, the
additional protection provided by a search warrant will likely
be minimal. Since the police, by hypothesis, have probable
cause to seize the property, we can assume that a warrant will
be routinely forthcoming in the overwhelming majority of
cases. Finally, the carving out of a special warrant requirement for one type of personal property, but not for others,
will impose untoward costs on the criminal justice systems of
this country in terms of added delay .and uncertainty.
The impractical nature of the Court's line-drawing is
brought into focus if one places himself in the position of the
policeman confronting an automobile that properly has been
stopped. In approaching the vehicle and its occupants, the
officer must divide the world of personal property into three
groups. If there is probable cause to arrest the occupants,
then under Ckimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), he may
search objects within the occupants' immediate control, with
or without probable cause. If there is probable cause to
search the automobile itself, then under Carroll and Chambers
the entire interior area of the automobile may be searched,
with or without a warrant. But under Chadwick and the
present case, if any suitcase-like object is found in the car
outside the immediate control area of the occupants, it cannot be searched, in the absence of exigent circumstances, without a warrant.
The inherent opaqueness of these "principles," in terms of
the policies underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the confusion to be created for all concerned, is
readily illustrated. Suppose a portable luggage-containerrack is affixed to the top of the vehicle. Is the arresting officer constitutionally able to open this on the spot, on the theory
that it is like the car's trunk, or must he remove it and take
it to the station for a warrant, on the theory that it is like
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the 200-pound footlocker in Chadwick? Or suppose there is
probable cause to arrest persons seated in the front seat of the
automobile, and a suitcase rests on the back seat. Is that
suitcase within the area of immediate control, such that the
Chadwick-Sanders rules do not apply? Or suppose the arresting officer opens the car'$ trunk and finds that it contains an
array of containers-an orange crate, a lunch bucket, an I
attache case, a duffelbag, a cardboa.rd box, a backpack, totebag, and a paper bag. Which of these ma.y be searched immediately, and which are so "personal'' that they must be
impounded for future search only pursuant to a warrant?
The problems of distinguishing between "luggage" and "some
integral part of the automobile," ante, at 10; between luggage
that is -within the "immediate control" of the arrestee and
luggage that is not; and between "personal luggage" and other:
"containers and packages" such as those most curiously
described, ante, at 11 n. 13, will be legion. The lines that
will be drawn will not make much sense in terms of the
policies of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Anq
the heightened possibilities for error will mean that many convictions will be overturned, highly relevant evidence again will
be excluded, and guilty persons will be set free in return for
little apparent gain in precise and clearly understood constitutional analysis.
In my view, it would be better to adopt a clea.r -cut rule
to the effect that a warrant should not be required to seize and
search any personal property found in an automobile that may
in turn be seized and searched without a w~rra.nt pursuant to
Carroll and Chambers. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433
U. S., at 21-22, and n. 13 (dissenting opinion). Such an approach would simplify the constitutional law of criminal
procedure without seriously derogating from the values protected by the Fourth Ame11dment's prohibition of unreasona-ble searches and seizures.
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Re:

77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Lewis:
I have been holding back in this case to see your response
to the dissent. As I see it, the error of the dissent is
treating this as an "automobile" case. It is not. Here, as
was the case in Chadwick, probable cause to seize the case
containing the contraband existed before the respondent ever
set foot in the taxicab and before the case was placed in the
trunk of the car. The fact that the case was being carried in
an automobile at the time of the stop does not turn this into
an "automobile" case for the police never had any reason to
suspect the car itself as harboring the contraband. The
probable cause that existed did not target the car itself as in
any way as suspect. It was the hand carried suitcase that was
the suspected locus of the contraband before it entered a
"neutral" car. Here, as in Chadwick, the relationship between
the car and the contraband for which the police were looking
was purely coincidental. In light of the dissent, I think you
need to drive the point home more forcefully than you do; I
hope you will do so when you respond to the dissent. Your
repeated references to the automobile (6 times) may mislead
some into thinking you regard this as an "automobile" search
case.
Like John, I think it might be a different case if the
police had probable cause to suspect the car as the locus of
contraband, as opposed to a particular suitcase hand carried.
Though I am not sure we would want to reach any different
result in such a case, I am inclined to agree with John's
suggestion that we leave the proper result in a real
"automobile" case open at this time.
-I hope you will be willing to consider doing so.

1;;\rdfj

Mr. Justice Powell

'

'

May 10, 1979

Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497
Dear Chief:
Thank you for the thoughtful comments contained
in your note to me of May 9 concerning my opinion for the
Court in this case.~
,
~ ~ ~

~ ~~e-~tioR-.¥JJu

Although I- cem
I have the same reservations about adopting your
suggestions as I did about John Stevens' suggestions
contained in his memorandum to me of April 4. Like you,
John wished to narrow the holding of the Court in this
case to deal only with those situations in which the
police have probable cause to believe contraband in
contained in a partcular piece of luggage. He did not
want to comment in any way on the situation where the
probable cause pertains to the automobile generally.
.
~~l~,
As I recall, we took th1s case 1n order t ~
clarify the law of search and seizure involving
automobiles and luggage.
In order to provide the police
and trial courts with workable rules in this difficult
area, I believe it is necessary to lay down some broad
rules that do not turn on subtle distinctions. Moreover,
it was my understanding from Conference that this was the
view of the majority of our Brethren. This understanding
is confirmed, I believe by the "join" notes of both Bill
Brennan and Thurgood Marshall.
I beleve that the opinion
as now written best serves this end by eliminating the
need for those applying Fourth Amendment principles to
consider whether their probable cause applies to entire
automobiles or only portions thereof. As I said to John
in my memorandum of April 6, if the police have probable
cause to search an automobile, but have no reason to
believe contraband is contained in a particular piece of
luggage found in the automobile, then they may search the
rest of the vehicle and, finding nothing, then obtain a
warrant for the search of the luggage.
~'

Despite my reluctance to follow your recommended
course, I will of course defer to the wishes of the
majority.
Sincerely,

May 11, 1Q79
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Dear Chief:
Thank you for your note of Mav 9 sugaestinq a
possible modification of my opinion for the Court in this
case.
Your suggestion is substantially the same as that
made by John in his memorandum to me of Aoril 4. You and he
woul~ prefer to limit thP holding of the Court to situations
in which the police have probable cause to believe that
contraband is contained in a particular piece of luqgaqe,
thereby avoiding any discussion of "the auto'llobilP
excention".
This certainly

woul~

be one way to write the casP.

My understanding, however, was that we took this
case with the hope of clarifying whether Chadwick applied to
a piece of luggage in a movinq automobile steppe~ on probable
cause. The principal argument of the state of Arkansas was:

"The search here was clearly reasonable as being
made under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment". Br. o. 6, 7,
16-31.

,.

The oral argument, as I recall, also focused on the
applicability of the automobile exception. And my
recollection is that we discussed this case at Confer.encP
primarily in liqht of this argument.
I have thought that it would be helpful to make
clear that luggage, with respect to which there is a high

'...

..•

,.,
'

2.

expect a tion of privacy, is not subiect to the automobile
exception. As I have a Court for this view, I am naturaJlv
reluctant to und~rtake what would he view~d as a maior chnnqe
at this time.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

1
~·

Re:

77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring in the judg
I concur in the Court's judgment but cannot join its
unnecessarily broad opinion, which seems to treat this
case as if it involved the "automobile" exception to the
warrant requirement.

~ecause

It is not such a case.

the police officers had probable cause to

believe that respondent's green suitcase contained
marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the
taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before
opening it is clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 (1977)

J

The essence of our holding in Chadwick is

that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in the
contents of a trunk or suitcase accompanying or carried by
a person.

That expectation of privacy is not diminished

..

-"
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by the fact that the owner's arrest occurs in a public
place.

Whether arrested in a hotel ' lobby, an airport, a

railroad terminal, or on a public street as here, the
owner has the right to expect that the contents of his
luggage will not, without his consent, be exposed on
demand of the police.

If not carrying contraband, many

persons might choose under the circumstances to consent to
a search of their luggage to obviate any delay in securing
their release, which would necessarily be the case if
consent is not given.

But even if wholly innocent, some

persons might well prefer not to have the contents of
their luggage exposed in a public place.

They may stand

on their right to privacy and require a search warrant.
The warrant requirement is not so onerous as to command
suspension of Fourth Amendment guarantees once the
receptable involved is securely in the control of the
police as it was here after Sanders' arrest.
The breadth of the Court's opinion and its repeated
references to the "automobile" from which respondent's
suitcase was seized at the time of his arrest, however,
might lead the reader to believe -- as the dissenters
apparently do -- that this case involves the "automobile"
exception to the warrant requirement.
It does not.

See ante, at 9-12.

Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage

being transported by respondent

a~

the time of the arrest,

,·
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not the automobile in which it was carried, that was the
suspected locus of the contraband.

The relationship

between the automobile and the contraband was purely
coincidental, as in Chadwick.

The fact that the suitcase

was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an
"automobile" exception case.

The Court need say no more.

[This case simply does not present the question of
whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when
the police have probable cause to believe contraband is
located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not
know whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage
in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in
some part of the car's structure.

I am not sure whether

that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a
warrant, but it seems to me it would be better to await a
ase in which that question necessarily must be decidedJ
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a
"clear" rule, presumably one capable of resolving future
Fourth Amendment litigation.

That is not cause for

lament, however desirable it might be to fashion a
universal prescription governing the myriad of Fourth
Amendment cases that might arise.

We are construing the

Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for law
enforcement officers.

My disagreement with the Court's

.

,.

4

opinion is very different from that of the dissenters.
Our institutional practice, based on hard experience,
generally has been to refrain from deciding questions not
presented by the facts of a case; there are risks in
formulating constitutional rules broader than required by
the facts to which they are applied.
297

u.s.

288, 346-48
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STEVENS joins, concurring in the judgment.

I concur in the Court's judgment but cannot join its
unnecessarily broad opinion, which seems to treat this
case as if it involved the "automobile"
warrant requirement.

except~on
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It is not such a case.

Because the police officers had probable cause to
believe that respondent's green suitcase contained
marijuana before it was placed in the trunk of the
taxicab, their duty to obtain a search warrant before
opening it is clear under United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1 {1977).

The essence of our holding in Chadwick is

that a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in the
contents of a trunk or suitcase accompanying or carried by
a person.
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by the fact that the owner's arrest occurs in a public
place.

Whether arrested in a hotel lobby, an airport, a

railroad terminal, or on a public street as here, the
owner has the right to expect that the contents of his
luggage will not, without his consent, be exposed on
demand of the police.

If not carrying contraband, many

persons arrested in such circumstances might choose to
consent to a search of their luggage to obviate any delay
in securing their release.

But even if wholly innocent,

some persons might well prefer not to have the contents of
their luggage exposed in a public place.

They may stand

on their right to privacy and require a search warrant.
The warrant requirement is not so onerous as to command
suspension of Fourth Amendment guarantees once the
receptable involved is securely in the control of the
police, as it was here after Sanders' arrest.
The breadth of the Court's opinion and its repeated
references to the "automobile" from which respondent's
suitcase was seized at the time of his arrest, however,
might lead the reader to believe -- as the dissenters
apparently do -- that this case involves the "automobile"
exception to the warrant requirement.
It does not.

See ante, at 9-12.

Here, as in Chadwick, it was the luggage

being transported by respondent at the time of the arrest,
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not the automobile in which it was being carried, that was
the suspected locus of the contraband • . The relationship
between the automobile and the contraband was purely
coincidental, as in Chadwick.

The fact that the suitcase

was resting in the trunk of the automobile at the time of
respondent's arrest does not turn this into an
"automobile" exception case.

The Court need say no more.

This case simply does not present the question of
whether a warrant is required before opening luggage when
the police have probable cause to believe contraband is
located somewhere in the vehicle, but when they do not
know whether, for example, it is inside a piece of luggage
in the trunk, in the glove compartment, or concealed in
some part of the car's structure.

I am not sure whether

that would be a stronger or weaker case for requiring a
warrant, but it seems to me it would be better to await a
case in which that question necessarily must be decided.
The dissent complains that the Court does not adopt a
"clear" rule, presumably one capable of resolving future
Fourth Amendment litigation.

That is not cause for

lament, however desirable it might be to fashion a
universal prescription governing the myriad of Fourth
Amendment cases that might arise.

We are construing the

Constitution, not writing a statute or a manual for law
enforcement officers.

My disagreement with the Court's

4

opinion is very different from that of the dissenters.
Our institutional practice, based on hard experience,
generally has been to refrain from deciding questions not
presented by the facts of a case; there are risks in
formulating constitutional rules broader than required by
the facts to which they are applied.
297

u.s.

288, 346-48 (1936)
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 7, 1979

Re:

77-1497 - Arkansas v. Sanders

Dear Lewis:
Since I will be joining the Chief's separate
concurrence, I will withdraw my separate opinion.
Respectfully,
'l

Jri
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

LFP/lab

6/19/79

77-1497 Arkansas v. Saqders
(Oral Sta7 tent from Bench)

-

The question presented in this case/ is whether
police lawfully may

----

search~personal

luggage without a

warrant, where the luggage is taken from an automobile; '

..----,

stopped on the stree )fpursuant to probable cause to

believ ~

that the luggage contains contraband.
Police in Little Rock, Arkansas, were advised by a
reliable informant; 'that respondent would arrive at the
airport, carrying a green suitcas ~containing marijuana.
Upon his arrival, respondent - with a green suitcase - took a

€~ and

proceeded to leave the airport.

the cab, searched

The police stopped

vt
t~·~~tom6ai~e,

and - finding the suitcase
..4-")(~ de. ~1¥
in the trunk - opened and ~earcheG it without a warrant.
"'\

They found ten pounds of

packa~~d

marijuana, evidence used to

convict respondent.
It is settled law that, / absent unusual
circumstances,j the Fourth Amendment requires / that a search be
both reasonabl j land performed pursuant to a warrant.
the few exceptions to this warrant
generally to automobiles.

One of

requiremen~applies

Because of their mobility,j it

often is impractical; 'to obtain a warrant before the vehicle
itself is searched.
expectation of

Moreover, there is only a limited

privacy~with respect to what one carries in an

automobile.

w~~~~~ ~~

u.s.

v?-4~

2.

fw-d .j..J. --.. ~~
We held, however, - in United States v.

Chad~,

A

that personal luggage - as to which there normally / is a high
expectation of privacy - may ____..
not be searched without a
warrant.
Applying this rule, the Supreme Court of Arkansas
reversed respondent's conviction ;Jholding that even though
the personal luggage was taken from an automobile; 'validly
stopped,j a warrant was necessary.
We affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of
~
~~ ;,A,.,/"t~t ·'lt.. ..,;
Arkansas. We do not think that personal luggage~ found with1n
an automobile;fcomes within the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement.

There was no danger that the luggage,

~~~ ,;.~ j.L~~{

once seized, could - like an automobile - moue

awa. ~

wriile a

warrant was being sought.

~

~

This holding protects the privacy interest in
personal luggage ; fand it should not handicap
performance of their duty.

police~in

the

In this case, the Little Rock

Police, up to the time they opened the luggage, had acted
efficiently and commendably.

They should, however, have

taken respondent and his suitcase/ to the station hou; ; 'where
an independent magistrate / could determine whether the
issuance of a warrant was appropriate.
The Chief Justice has filed a separate opinion

·

/

3.

concurring in the judgment, in which Mr. Justice Stevens has
joined.

Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting opinion

in which Mr. Justice Rehnquist has joined.
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June 20, 1979
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Arkansas v. Sanders, No. 77-1497
N{ ne cases have been held for Arkansas v.
Sanders: United States v. Stevie, No. 18-971~ Robbins v.
California, No. 78-567~ DeMarco v. United States, No. 785712~ sink v. United States, No. 78-60~8~ DeSantis v. New
York, No. 78-6076: Grim v. United States, No. 78-6088:
GaUitney v. United States, No. 78-6098: Adams v. Illinois,
No. 78-g283: and Guzman v. Louisiana, No. 78-6319.
1•

No. 78-971 (Cert to

The facts in Sievie ar~ almost identical to those
in Arkansas v. Sanders. Acting on a tip, DEA agents
observed as respondents retrieved two suitcases from the
bag9age claim area of an airport, entered an automobile,
and drove away. Because of respondents' suspicious
actions and ,the tip,. the agents ptilled the auto over and,
upon smellinq marijuana, took the suitcases from the
trunk, searched them, and 'found marijuana. The Eighth
Circuit, acting en bane, reversed respondents' convictions
for possession of mariiuana, relying on United States v.
Chadwick, 433 u.s. 1 (1977).
'
The Government argues that this case is
controlled by whatever ' this Court decides in Arkansas v.
Sanders: Indeed, the Solicitor General specifically
states that, "[i]f ••• the Court affirms the judgment of the
Arkansas Supreme Court in Sanders, ,this petition should be
denied." I will vote to follow the Soli6itor General's
suggestion and deny certiorari. Although the DEA agents
did not receive information specifically concerning the
suitcases, by the time of the search they had probable
cause with respect to them. The situation posed by the
Chi~f Ju~tice in Sanders therefore is not p ~ esented here.
Although · the Solic1tor General mentions in a footnote the
issue _of the retroactive application of Chadwick, and .
notes t Ji a t there is a division among the c1rcu1ts on the

·~fl]

he does not
Court to qrant certiorari
to decide the issue. We did not'-"specifically consider the •:!
retroactive -application of Chadwick in Sanders because it
was n_ot raised - by tthe 1: par'ties . We did, however, rely upon
Chad~ick · in ruling on the constitutionality of a pre~
Chadwick search. Although we may at some point have to .
take up this question, . I would prefer ·to wait and see how
the lower courts resoond to Sanders. r~herefore will
vote to deny certior_ari in United Stateft v. Stevie, No.
que~tion,

78...:971.

.,;~

,

Robbins v. California, No. 78-567

Cal. Ct. App. )
~.

~

r

r

"":i-

,,

~

'·

IJ1&,. Robbins ,po.pce ~ stopped petitioner because
was driving erratlcally, and, when the.y observed his
demeanor and smelled the inside of his automobile,
arrested him for driving under the influence pf ~ marijuana~
He thereupon informed the ' Y>qlice that "what you are.'
';;
~ looking for: is in the 'back." Upon s'earqhinq . his auto,
they discovered two suitcases and two sealed packages, in
each of ~ which they di~co~ered " marijuana. The California
Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction, ruling
that the s~arch was ·..ralid under t'he automobile exception
to the ~varrant Clause, ·and . that Chadwick did not apply- · ;,
because the officers did not have an opportunity to obtain
a warrant before stopping the auto and because the contact
bet~een the auto and the ~~itcases ~as more extended than
in Gnadwick..
'~~
~

'.

c

The rationale of the California
with our ruling in Arkansas v. Sanders. ' Nonetheless, we
should afford t,he Ca1ifornia court an opportunity to
consider whether the otherwise invalid search was
consented to wnen petitioner suqqested the police look~nin
the ·back." I therefore will vote to · grant, vacate, and
remand No. 78-567 in ligh~t of the Court's decision in
Arkansas v. Sanders.
3.

DeMarco
to cAi) >

DeMarco petitioner was stopped after driving
erratically and be1ng abusive to the police. Wh~n ~he
officers observed a larqe. knife in petitioner's
•
possession,
they arrested
him for "possible -use of
.
.,...
.

/

·,.

3.

controlled substances." After handcuffing him and placing
him in the patrol car, the police searched petitioner's
belonqings and there found a zippered case containing
cocaine. The Sixth Circuit affirmed petitioner's
conviction, finding that there was probable cause for the
arrest and that the search had been incident to the
arrest.
Petitioner's search and seizure claim was
disposed of below without any reference to the automobile
exception to the Warrant Clause. There is no reason to
grant, vacate, and remand for reconsideration in light of
Arkansas v. Sanders, therefore, as the rationale used by
the courts in DeMarco has nothing to do with the rationale
of Sanders. I see no point in reviewing the correctness
of the lower courts' conclusion that the facts of this
case fall within the search incident to arrest doctrine.
I therefore will vote to deny certior.ari in No. 78-5712 • .
4.

Sink v. United States, No. 78-6058 (Cert to
CAS), &

'· Petitioners in Sink and Grim were known by the
police to be enqaqed in passing counterfeit currency.
After following petitioners in a high speed chase, police
stopped petitioners' automobile and arrested a third
member of the group. Upon •patting down• Petitioners, the
police discovered several packages of counterfeit bills.
The police thereuoon seized the automobile under 49 u.s.c.
S78i, which permits the Government to seize ,and forfeit
any vehicle used to transport counterfeit currency. The
vehicle was towed to the Sheriff's Department and the
police inventoried it, discovering a zippered shoulder bag
containing a larqe number of bills. They immediately
closed the bag, obtained a warrant for its search, and
returned to find that it contained $31,000 in counterfeit
currency.
On appeal, the court upheld the search of the
zippered bag, ruling that it was within the automobile
excevtion to the warrant clause, or, alternatively, that
it was a proper search incident to the federal forfeiture
statute. The ~ourt ~ noted that it had ruled previously

'•

c><.

'i•'.

4.

that Chadwick would not ' apply to searches, such as this,
that occurred prior to the Court's decision in that case.
There appear to be several possible
justifications for the search that would have nothing to
do wi~~ the automobile excepti~n addressed in Sande~s ~ . ... , "1
The . eventual search was pursuant to a warrant, the lnitlal ~"
search' rnay have been a proper inventory search under South
Dakota-· v. Opperman, ,428 u.s . 364 C1976)(although there was
no evidence adduced concerning the regular police
procedures for sue~ searches), ~nd ii appears that under
the federal 'forfeiture statute the automobile no lonqer
belonged to petitioners in any event. Once again there "iS
the lurking issue of the retroact~ive . application of
Chadwick, but, as 'with United St~tes v. Stevie, No. 78971, I would defer this ,question for the time being.
Accordingl y , I wil L vote' to deny certiorari in both No.
78-6058 a nd No. 78-6088.
78-6076 (Cert to

6.
1'

In DeSantis Pol ice, acting on a tip from ~an
airline employee ~ho · had seen marijuana in petitioner's
suitcase, apprehended pe titioner as he picked up his bag
from the baggage cl'aim area. They arrested him and took
• him to a ·police subst·a·tion located tdthin ,. tbe airport,
where the bag was searched and fh~ marijuana found : ~he
New York Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's ~
conviction, ruling that the search was incident to his
lawful arrest. ~he dissenters ar~ued that Chadwick
required . reversal.
'•

,.
As in DeMarco v. United , States, No. 78-5712,
there is no automobile exception , issue in this case '· as the
. courts below decided it. There is therefore no point in
asking ·· the New . York court to reconsider its decision in
1 ight of Arkansas v. Sanders .
There may ~ be substant'ial
qu~stions concerning the application of th ~ search ~·. incident to arrest doctrine ' to the facts of this case, but
I would nq~ · wish to grant certiorari merely to review this
limited questi9n. I therefore will vote to deny
certiorari in No. 78-6076•

j

~~

'.

5.

No. 78-6098 (Cert

7.

Petitioner in Gaultney was involved in a sale of
cocaine to DEA agents. One of his partners had arranged
to deliver the merchandise to the agents and was about to
get it from his truck ~ when the agents arrested him. In ·
the truck they found a "Scrabble" box containing the
cocaine. , The agents then proceeded to a house where they
knew petitioner to be, entered without a warrant, and
arrested petitioner. The Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court's decision to suppress the evidence, finding that
unde~ the automobile exception to " the Warrant Clause the
search of the box had been justified. T-he court
,
·
distinguished Chadwick, . finding that here there were
exigent circumstances justifying the search, and that
there were diminished , expectations of privacy {because the
seller w~s .about to give the box to the agents). The
court also upheld petitioner's arrest, finding that ,there
was probable cause and exigent circumst~nces justifying
it.
There aie substantial st~nding problems under
Rakas v. Illinois conderning the . ~earch and seizure claim,
as only petitioner seeks certioriri and it appears that
only petitioner's parfner had any substantial ihtere~t in
the truck that was searched. Moreover, I qu~stion whether
the nature of a "Scrabble" box precludes any substantial
expect a tion o f privacy , therein. See Arkansas v. Sanders,
n. 13. But the issue of the propriety of petitioner's
arrest seems a substantial, one that is related to that1
presen'ted in Payton v. New York, No. 78-5~ 20, s.e t for. :.
reargument next Term. I therefore will vote to hold No.
78-6098 for No. 78-5420.
•'

8. ' Adams v. Illinois, No.

· Ct. App.)
Petitioner ,in Adams was arrested for
violation and his automobile was seized by the oolice. ·~·
Several days after petitioner had be"'e n re.leased ~ the
police discovered that the automobile, which petitioner
had not claimed, was stolen. They contacted the owner,
who oP,ened the tr,unk for the police, where they found a
shotgun and three suitcases belonging to petitioner. In '
the suitcases, the oolice found various items taken during

.
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